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In February 2006, Sonae presented a hostile takeover offer for 100% of Portugal Telecom’s 
(PT) outstanding shares. If it was accepted, it would have been the largest ever business deal 
in Portugal. 
Although the offer was rejected, it changed the Portuguese telecommunications industry by 
leading to the separation of PT and Portugal Telecom Multimedia (PTM) via spin-off. 
In this thesis I examine the motivations for this spin-off transaction and its implications on 
both firm’s capital structure decisions. 
By comparing each firm debt level (implicit debt level) with the one that would minimize 
their cost of capital (optimal debt level), derived via WACC minimization, I conclude that 
after the spin-off, the capital allocation efficiency worsened significantly. 
Furthermore I argue that in both PT and PTM the detrioration was a direct consequence of 
the spin-off. As such, my findings contrast with previous studies that suggest that capital 
allocation efficiency improves, or at least remains u changed, following a spin-off. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In February 2006, Sonae presented a hostile takeover offer for 100% of Portugal Telecom’s 
(PT) outstanding shares. If it was accepted, it would have been the largest ever business deal 
in Portugal. 
A year later the offer failed, and Sonae was not able to gain control of PT. However, this 
event contributed to a significant change in the Portuguese telecommunications sector. Until 
that point, PT dominated all the segments of the industry (fixed telephone, mobile telephone, 
internet and television), not having to face significant competition (except for the mobile 
telephone segment). However as a consequence of thefailur  of the hostile takeover, PT had 
to spin-off one of its largest subsidiaries, Portugal Telecom Multimedia (PTM). 
PTM dominated a segment (television), had significant market share in other (internet) and, 
soon after the spin-off was announced, began operating in fixed telephone, thus creating a true 
competitor to PT. 
The main objective of this thesis is two analyze this ransaction and the impact it had on PT 
and PTM’s capital structure. Based on the existing literature for capital structure decisions, 
and more specifically for spin-off transactions, this thesis will focus on answering the 
following questions: 
- Which were the factors that motivated the spin-off? 
- What was the immediate impact on leverage for both firms? 
- Did the spin-off increase or decrease the capital allocation efficiency1 on both firms? 
To answer the first question, I analyze the announcement made by PT’s Board. If besides the 
two factors officially mentioned to explain this spin-off transaction (increase the remuneration 
package so that PT’s shareholders would not accept Sonae’s offer and regulatory pressure) 
there were other factors that could have been relevant to this decision. 
The second question is to analyze both firms’ leverag  on the period around the transaction 
and its variation, identifying if it is consistent with the traditional theory on the subject. 
Finally, I will compare PT and PTM’s implicit capital structure with its optimal capital 
structure and evaluate the impact of the spin-off. 
                                                           
1 It’s the difference between optimal and implicit capital structure. The lower is the difference, between these 
two indicators, the larger is the capital allocation efficiency. 
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In order to estimate the optimal capital structure, I will make a sensitivity analysis, testing 
different debt levels. The cost of equity will be valued using CAPM and the cost of debt will 
be determined using the Damodaran (2012) approach on synthetic ratings. 
In answering all of these questions, I will compare PT and PTM’s results with industry peers 
selected from sector indexes, respectively Eurostoxx Telecommunications Index and BI 
Europe Cable & Satellite Index. 
This thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review on capital structure 
decisions, Section 3 has a brief introduction of the PT Group (that includes both firms), 
questions and methodology are explained in Section 4, a d in Section 5 I review the results. 
Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions and the limitations of the study are presented in 
Section 7.   
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 - Traditional theories on Capital Structure: 
Companies finance their assets by different forms of funding, both internal and external, 
thereby determining their capital structure. If instead of distributing profits from previous 
years, companies decide to retain them, they are using internal financing. By contrast, if they 
are using the capital markets to obtain funds, theyar  using external financing. Companies try 
to meet their financial needs by mixing these two types of financing and they can change their 
capital structure throughout the company life according to their life cycle, market conditions 
or preferences of the manager/owner. 
The basis of the research in capital structure theory and financing decisions was established 
by the work of Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller in 1958. They derived the following 
rule of optimal investment “(…) the type of instrument used to finance an investment is 
irrelevant to the question of whether or not the investment is worthwhile” (Modigliani and 
Miller 1958, pp.292). 
This proposition was based on a market with certain conditions, like the absence of taxes, no 
bankruptcy costs and no agency costs or asymmetry of information. Additionally, it assumed 
atomistic competition in the capital markets and easy access to those markets. 
These types of conditions are hardly observable in capital markets and that was also assumed 
by the authors “Having served their purpose they can now be relaxed in the direction of 
greater realism and relevance” (Modigliani and Miller 1958, pp.296). 
By eliminating some of these assumptions, different sults are obtained. Both Modigliani and 
Miller later considered the effect of corporate taxes on capital structure decisions and 
concluded: “(…) that the tax advantages of debt financing are somewhat greater than we 
originally suggested and, to this extent, the quantitative difference between the valuations 
implied by our position and by the traditional view is narrowed.” (Modigliani and Miller 
1963, pp.434). 
However in the same article, the authors identified some reasons that explain why companies 
do not choose to be financed exclusively with debt. For instance, in some cases it might be 
cheaper for investors to finance via retained earnings (considering personal income taxes or 
some limitations imposed by lenders). So, in order to find the best possible capital structure, 
each company must consider the pros and cons of the choice between internal and external 
forms of funding. This discussion lays the ground for the trade-off theory. 
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2.1.1 – The Trade-off Theory: 
This theory argues that the financing choice is made by considering the benefits and costs of 
increasing (or decreasing) leverage (percentage of the firm’s assets financed by debt). 
According to Graham and Leary (2011, pp.9)“(…) the static tradeoff suggests firms choose 
their capital structure to balance the benefits of debt financing (e.g. corporate tax savings and 
mitigation of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders) with the direct and 
indirect costs of financial distress.”. Based on this definition, a number of implications could 
be derived, the first one being that profitability and leverage should be positively correlated. 
The most profitable firms face the highest marginal tax rates, so the higher the debt, the 
higher the tax savings. Another fact that reinforces this finding is that firms with larger profits 
face a smaller probability of bankruptcy, which lowers the bankruptcy cost. Debt could also 
be used to mitigate the agency costs between managers nd shareholders. As more profitable 
firms generate more free cash flow, managers without supervision could use it to invest in 
riskier projects. So, by issuing debt, the interest payments generated will align the incentives 
of managers and shareholders and will force managers to allocate the resources more 
efficiently. According to Jensen (1986, pp.325)“The t reat caused by failure to make debt 
service payments serves an effective motivating force to make such organizations more 
efficient”. 
There are other implications that can be derived from this theory, such as firms with more 
tangible assets that are more redeployable should have igher leverage, because it lowers its 
bankruptcy cost. For the same reason, firms with more intangible assets or with high R&D 
intensity should be less leveraged. Finally, firms with higher depreciation expenses should 
have less leverage, because these expenses generate a tax benefit that will lower the tax 
benefits of debt. 
This theory assumes that firms have target leverage r tios and some authors such as Jalilvand 
and Harris (1984) present evidence that firms manage leverage towards an optimal ratio. 
The trade-off theory explains several patterns and trends in the corporate strategy decision 
process of firms, but according to authors, like Graham and Leary (2011), there are important 
shortcomings, like the fact that many profitable firms facing high marginal tax rates have very 
little leverage. Further, directional trade-off predictions explain little of the observed capital 
structure variation and the rate of the reversion to target is too slow to be considered a firm’s 
priority. There are some authors that defend that a firm can have different debt ratios 
according to its life cycle: star-up firms will have ery little or none debt, as a firm grows it 
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starts to use debt as its cash flows become predictable and when the firm reaches its mature 
state the debt ratio tends to reach its peak.  
So, in order to address these shortcomings, other theo ies must be considered to explain the 
capital structure decision: 
2.1.2 – Pecking order theory: 
This theory argues, according to Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), that firms 
choose their capital structure according to a financing hierarchy, where firms usually prefer 
internal finance. If external finance is needed, firms issue debt first, then hybrid securities, 
like convertible bonds, and only as a last resort issue equity.  
Managers prefer to finance via internal financing (retained earnings), and when not enough, 
management may also plan to cover part the investments with new debt but, according to 
Myers (1984, pp.589) “it tries to restrain itself enough to keep the debt safe”, which means 
“reasonably close to default-risk free”. As debt level increases so does the costs of financial 
distress (bankruptcy costs) and the financial flexibility of the firm for new issues of debt 
becomes smaller. 
Only after these possibilities are exhausted would management consider issuing equity, which 
is why, according to Graham and Leary (2011, pp.319) “there is a significant negative market 
reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity issues”. 
However, according to Fama and French (2005) and Leary and Roberts (2010), the pecking 
order theory predicts a relatively small number of debt and equity issuance decisions. 
Overall both the pecking order and the trade-off theories leave many financing decisions 
unexplained and offer some conflicting predictions.  
2.1.3 – Alternative theories 
The shortcomings of the traditional capital structure theories have created room for different, 
more recent, attempts to explain the capital structu e decision and two significant ones are the 
market timing theory by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and the mechanical stock price 
explanation by Welch (2004). 
Baker and Wurgler (2002, pp.3) argue that “capital s ructure is largely the cumulative 
outcome of past attempts to time the equity market”, which means, as Antão and Bonfim 
(2008, pp.175) stated, that “managers tend to time the market by issuing shares when the 
equity market is perceived as more favorable”. These findings are contradictory to the 
traditional capital structure theories, because they do not follow the pecking order hierarchy 
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of financing, as equity could be issued before debt or even before the firm consumes all of its 
retained earnings. It also contradicts the trade-off theory of a target leverage ratio. 
On the other hand, Welch (2004, pp.107) argues that ‘‘(...) over reasonably long time frames, 
the stock price effects are considerably more important in explaining debt-equity ratios than 
previously identified proxies’’, which means that the capital structure is primarily affected by 
external influences of stock returns instead of being influenced by the decisions undertaken 
by the management. 
2.1.4 – Facts unaddressed by traditional theories  
The theories reviewed in the previous sections present the most comprehensive explanations 
on the capital structure decision. However, according to Graham and Leary (2011) there are 
several aspects unaddressed or wrongly tackled by those theories like mis-measurement of 
variables (leverage, distress costs or tax shields); the effect capital structure has on non-
financial stakeholders, supply conditions in the capital market, financial contracting and the 
value effects of capital structure.  
One aspect not identified in the work of Graham andLeary was the role that internal markets 
have in the capital structure decisions inside corporate groups, specifically the role that a 
parent company has in financing its subsidiary and how a subsidiary capital structure changes 
when it is spun-off.  
In the following section I review the literature onthose subjects, which are closely related to 
the topic of this thesis. 
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2.2 – Capital Structure in a corporate group and the impact of a Spin-off 
2.2.1 – Capital structure in a corporate group 
Before reviewing the existing literature about the financing decisions within a corporate group 
we must gain an understanding on what defines it. 
Using the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) it is possible to present a 
definition that is understandable and comparable across international boundaries, and so, 
according to IFRS 10 – Consolidated Financial Statements, a corporate group is comprised by 
a parent company and subsidiary and the parent controls the subsidiary. According to the 
same standard, a parent controls its investee when it as all of the following: power over the 
investee; exposure, or rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee; and 
the ability to use its power over the investee to affect the amount of the investor’s return. 
Previous standards, like the International Accounting Standard 27 (IAS 27)2, established that 
control was presumed when the parent holds more than half of the voting rights of an entity. 
As I have presented in the previous section, traditional capital structure theories focus on 
standalone companies but as Bianco and Nicodano (2006, pp.938) stated “(…) the capital 
structure of group affiliated companies is richer since they have access to both the internal 
(within the group) and the external capital market”. This topic will be analyzed further in the 
next section. 
2.2.1.1 – Debt issuance in a corporate group 
Not only is the decision on capital structure more complex because of the access to within the 
group financing, it also requires to consider the financial structure of the group as a whole. 
In terms of issuing debt, as the parent company faces limited liability in case of the 
insolvency of the subsidiary, there is an incentive for issuance of debt by the latter. However, 
and as Bianco and Nicodano (2006) argue in their study, this factor could present an incentive 
for management to allocate riskier projects to the subsidiary. The lenders, anticipating this 
scenario would charge higher interest rates which might offset the advantages of the issuance 
of debt by the subsidiary. 
The result of their study was that, in their sample, arent companies issue external debt and 
are net lenders to their subsidiaries and therefore but they only analyze corporate groups 
within a country, but if multinational corporations are considered, where the parent and the 
                                                           
2 IAS 27 is superseded by IFRS 10 with effect from annual periods beginning on or after 1st January 2013. 
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subsidiary are present in different markets, facing different tax rates and different bankruptcy 
costs, we might obtain different results. 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1994, pp.263), argue that the “optimal debt financing strategy for the 
subsidiary is determined by the trade-off between tax savings due to the deductibility of 
interest expense and bankruptcy costs” and based on their model, they predict that a 
subsidiary will have a larger proportion of external debt if it is facing a higher tax rate than 
the parent. 
So, based on the existing literature an argument can be made that subsidiaries rely primarily 
on financing within the group and only issue external debt if the tax advantages offset the 
bankruptcy costs. 
2.2.1.2– Equity issuances in a corporate group 
The adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that firms, on average, will 
issue stock when managers have private information that their stock is overvalued. Then, in a 
parent-subsidiary framework, as Nanda (1991) argues, subsidiary stock issues will occur 
when its assets are overvalued and the parent’s assets are undervalued. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Slovin and Sushka (1997, pp.842) analyzed subsidiary equity 
issuances and concluded that “Gains in parent value exc ed losses sustained by minority 
shareholders of issuing subsidiaries so, contrary to prior evidence about negative wealth 
effects of seasonal equity issuance, announcements of subsidiary stock offerings increase the 
value of the combined enterprise”. 
Vijh (2006) presents a different approach to this issue. He argues that, based on a sample of 
127 seasoned equity offerings (SEO’s) within parent-subsidiary structures during 1981-2002, 
“the market perceives the issuing firm to be overvalued, but perceives no significant new 
information concerning the nonissuing firm’s value”(Vijh 2006, pp.1339) . Furthermore, he 
identified the three main types of equity issues in these structures and defined them as parent 
primary issue, a subsidiary primary issue, and a subsidiary secondary issue of stock held by 
the parent and analyzed the motivations behind them. He concluded that both higher prior 
year returns and financing deficits were significant f ctors for both primary issues, but neither 
was a significant factor regarding secondary issues. 
Vijh (2006) also concluded that the choice between which firm issues stock is driven by the 
overvaluation of the issued stock and that funds are not transferred across firms within 
corporate group structures.  
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2.2.2 – Spin-off and the effect on the capital structure 
2.2.2.1 – Forms of restructuring 
Since I am analyzing the effect that a spin-off hadon an entity’s capital structure, in this 
section I identify and define the corporate divestiture forms. 
There are three major forms in which a firm can divest: sell-offs, equity carve-outs and spin-
offs. 
In an asset sell-off, the subsidiary is sold to a third party and the parent firm receives cash in 
the transaction.  
An equity carve-out occurs when a firm issues equity of a subsidiary. The parent receives 
cash and the buyers of the stock are the new shareholders of the firm. However, the parent 
firm maintains a controlling interest in the subsidiary that is being carved out.  
Finally, the spin-off also involves an equity issuance of a subsidiary, but in this case the 
parent firm does not receive cash in the transaction because the new shares are distributed to 
the existing shareholders of the parent as a pro rata dividend.  
2.2.2 – Vertical divestiture and the decision between spin-off and a carve-out: 
Analyzing the vertical3 divestiture decision, Jain, Kini and Shenoy (2011) suggest that parent 
firms are more likely to divest subsidiaries whose industries experience positive demand 
shocks and that the firms undertaking these decisions are relatively less productive parent 
firms as their assets/subsidiaries are more valuable to other firms in the industry. They also 
concluded that “attractive industry financing conditions, particularly in subsidiary firm 
industries, instead of internal financing constraints fluence integrated firms to consider 
financial divestitures” (Jain, Kini and Shenoy (2011, pp.603). Other authors like Duhaime and 
Grant (1984) hypothesized several individual factors  be relevant on the divestment decision 
and concluded that divestment decisions tend to be made when firm financial strength, as 
measured by the ROE4, is low by comparison to industry financial strength.  Duhaime and 
Grant (1984) also concluded that divested units had low competitive and financial strength 
and low interdependency with the firm’ other units. 
Analyzing the method of vertical divestiture the financial constraints become relevant and 
“vertical divestiture is likely to be a carve-out instead of a spin-off in face of tighter financial 
                                                           
3
 The disposal of some or all of the subsidiaries, divisions or assets that make up a company’s vertical 
combination 
4 Return on Equity 
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constraints” as argued by Jain, Kini and Shenoy (2011, pp.605), which means that if the 
subsidiary is financed significantly by the parent, it is more likely the parent would decide to 
do an equity carve-outs, retaining control of the entity.  
Furthermore, Jain, Kini and Shenoy (2011) also conclude that spin-offs are more likely in 
larger industries which experience positive demand shocks. 
Other authors like Johnson, Klein and Thibodeaux (1996, pp.306) have argued that “firms 
engaging in spin-offs are larger, more highly leveraged and have higher asset turnover and 
lower real asset growth than their industry rivals”. 
2.2.3 – Impact of a spin-off in the capital structure 
In spin-offs, managers issue equity of a subsidiary that already exists or could result from 
breaking up a company by allocating a segment of the original firm’s assets and liabilities to a 
newly formed company. 
Since management can arbitrarily choose the financig mix of the new company, this could 
imply an incentive to allocate a larger debt load to the subsidiary in order to leave the parent 
less leveraged. One example of this was the Marriot spin-off, which, as Parrino (1997, pp. 
269) concluded, would have “reduced the value of the assets underlying the bondholder 
claims”, without increasing the interest amount paid to the bondholders. However even 
without covenant protection, the bondholders were abl to force a modification in the spin-off 
plan.  
These findings are consistent with the work of McNeil and Moore (2005) and Gertner, 
Powers and Scharfstein (2002) that concluded that there was no general tendency to 
misallocate capital by the parent. On the determinants of debt allocation, John (1993) 
concluded that profitability was a significant factor when allocating debt. 
Mehrotra, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) were able to stablish some relationships between 
financial indicators from the companies emerging from the spin-off and the debt ratio. They 
concluded that high profitability, higher level (and lower volatility) of cash operating returns, 
and larger proportions of assets in property, plant and equipment are positively related to 
higher debt ratios. 
Analyzing the post spin-off period, several authors have studied the evolution of leverage in 
the companies emerging from the transaction. John (1993), Johnson, Klein and Thibodeaux 
(1996) and Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakuman (1997) have concluded that there is no significant 
change in leverage levels following spin-offs. Other authors, like Michaely and Shaw (1995), 
obtained different results, finding that only the spin-off parents decreased debt levels. 
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Assessing the impact of a spin-off in the capital alloc tion efficiency, Gertner Powers and 
Scharfstein (2002, pp.2504) found that “one of the eff cts of the spinoff – or even one of the 
reasons they are undertaken in the first place- is to increase the efficiency of capital 
allocation”, because they found that financing within t e group is inefficient on average. 
Other authors concluded that the allocation of debt oes not change significantly following 
the spin-off and that “spinoffs are not commonly motivated by a desire to improve the 
allocation of capital, unless most firms are unable to realize intended improvements” McNeil 
and Moore (2005, pp. 265). Finally, Johnson, Klein and Thibodeaux (1996) conclude that 
both the parent and the subsidiary experience increases in real asset growth following spin-
offs, and the parent firms experience significant improvements in the cash flow margin on 
sales. 
2.3. - Business Line and Country analysis 
2.3.1 – Telecommunications sector: 
Since this thesis examines capital structure decisions in a telecommunications company, in 
this section I review some of the latest developments in the capital structure decision in this 
sector. 
In Europe, since the mid 1990’s there was an increasing volume of market reforms.  
Cambini and Rondi (2011) characterized the sector in many European countries as being 
dominated by an incumbent, with an almost monopolistic position, that competes with smaller 
alternative operators.  
They also argue that in response to market reforms, many incumbents expanded their activity 
by growth through mergers and acquisitions and into related markets. 
These companies financed its growth via leverage, sp cifically when undertaking large 
investments and, as Cambini and Rondi (2011) concluded, the increase in leverage also has an 
impact in the regulated rates, increasing them. Regulators in order to provide an investment 
incentive to the incumbent may raise the access charge, which in turn solidifies incumbent 
market position, thus having a negative impact in the competition. 
As the result of the increase in leverage, many of major EU telecommunications companies 
have large net debt positions. 
The United States faces a similar situation, where d r gulation caused an abnormal increase 
in leverage. According to Leach, Moyen and Yang (2013, pp.334) “this increase is consistent 
with the introduction of a new benefit of debt when the product market opens to competition”.  
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Chapter 3 - Company background: 
PT was, in 2007, the largest telecommunications company in Portugal and one of the largest 
Portuguese companies overall. It is the incumbent Portuguese operator and provides several 
services to its customers, such as: 
- Fixed telephone services; 
- Mobile telephone services; 
- Internet Service Provider; 
- Cable distribution network operator; 
- Data transmission services; 
- Voice over internet services (VoIP). 
PT was founded in 1994, resulting from the merger of three independent, publicly owned, 
operators: Telefones de Lisboa e Porto, Telecom Portugal and Teledifusora de Portugal. With 
the merger, PT became the only national telecommunications operator. 
Through the 1990s, the Portuguese government carried out a privatization program. This 
occurred in several steps and by the end of 2000 all but 500 "golden shares" (nominal shares 
which are able to outvote all other shares in certain specified circumstances) of its capital was 
privately owned, making it one of the most privatized European Telecoms. 
PT started as a fixed telecommunications operator, but began investing heavily in new 
technologies, such as mobile telephone services and internet access service in the 1990’s. 
In 2000, the Portuguese telecommunications sector was fully opened to competition and as a 
consequence PT’s market share on its most traditional business, fixed telephone services, 
dropped significantly(from 92% in 2001 to 71% in 2006)5. The same happened to its 
contribution to the group revenue, as presented in table 1: 
  
                                                           
5 Anacom’s Situação das Telecomunicações 2006 
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Table 1 - PT’s Revenue by operational segment (2001-2006) 
Business 
Segments 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 














1.401 24% 1.218 22% 1.362 24% 1.599 27% 2.037 32% 2.105 33% 
Multimedia 592 10% 640 11% 684 12% 598 10% 627 10% 664 10% 
Other 160 3% 210 4% 246 4% 82 1% 215 3% 238 4% 
Total 
Revenue 
5.726 100% 5.582 100% 5.776 100% 5.886 100% 6.385 100% 6.343 100% 
Source: Bloomberg, Portugal Telecom Annual Reports (2002-2007) 
Values in €M 
 
PT had also begun to expand internationally, targetin  markets in Africa, Asia and South 
America. By 2007, PT had a significant shareholder stake in Médi Telecom (Morocco), Unitel 
(Angola), MTC (Namibia), CST (Sao Tome e Principe, CVT (Cape Verde), Timor Telecom 
(East Timor), CTM (Macao), UOL and Brasilcel (Brazil). 
Beginning in 1998, PT and Telefonica (Spanish Telecommunications incumbent) announced 
an agreement regarding their Brazilian assets in order to create a strategic joint venture for the 
mobile-phone segment in Brazil called Brasilcel, which eventually would control the largest 
mobile phone operator in South America (VIVO). As part of the agreement, Telefonica 
increased its shareholders stake in PT to 10 percent, b coming at the time the largest 
shareholder. 
Multimedia Sector 
In 1994, PT created TV Cabo Portugal S.A. (TV Cabo), a TV cable and satellite operator, 
which shortly after became the operator with the largest market share. 
In July 1999, as part of the PT Group reorganization process, PT formed Portugal Telecom 
Multimedia (PTM) transferring to the new company TVCabo, SAPO (internet services 
provider) and a minority stake in Páginas Amarelas, the leading Portuguese telephone 
directories business. 
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PTM had its initial public offering (IPO) in November 1999, having PT remained the largest 
shareholder (with a stake greater than 58 percent). 
In the years following the IPO, PTM acquired Lusomundo, a media holding company in 
Portugal, with cinema and movie distribution assets (Lusomundo Audiovisuais) and several 
newspapers and radio stations (Lusomundo Media). Later, in 2005, PTM sold Lusomundo 
Media. 
In January 2007, PTM launched voice telephony servic s, establishing itself as an integrated 
“triple play” operator (telephone, internet and television). 
Hostile Takeover offer by Sonae and aftermath: 
On February 6, 2006, Sonae SGPS, S.A. and Sonaecom—SGPS, S.A. announced an 
unsolicited tender offer for all the outstanding ordinary shares and convertible bonds of PT. 
Soon after, they extended the offer for all the outstanding ordinary shares of PTM, which was 
conditioned upon the successful purchase of more than 50% of the ordinary shares of PT.  
PT’s management advised its shareholders to reject Sonae’s proposal and, contingent to the 
failure Sonae’s offer, proposed a revised remuneration package for the 2006-2008 period (up 
from Euro 3.0 billion to Euro 3.5 billion)6 as well as the spin-off of the 58,43% shares PT had 
in PTM to all PT shareholders by way of a dividend i  kind.  
At the extraordinary meeting of shareholders, held on March 2, 2007, the proposal to remove 
the 10% voting limitation from the bylaws of PT was rejected. Since this was a necessary pre-
requisite established by Sonae, its takeover offer also failed. 
Hence, the spin-off of PTM advanced and it was concluded in 7th November 20077. 
  
                                                           
6 PT Board Press Release – Portugal Telecom approves proposal to spinoff PT Multimedia, to increase the 
proposal shareholder remuneration package to Euro 3.5 billion and to contribute Euro 1.0 billion in the pension 
funds – 3rd August 2006 
7 After 31st January 20008 Portugal Telecom Multimedia changed its name to Zon Multimedia 
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Chapter 4 – Research Questions and Methodology 
4.1 - Factors influencing PTM’s spin-off decision: 
On 3rd of August 2006, the Board of PT announced the approval of a proposal to spin-off 
PTM. At the time, the decision was explained with two main arguments: i) to increase the 
remuneration package to prevent Sonae and Sonaecom’s offer from succeeding, and ii) “to 
address the concerns regarding access network concentration…”8 However and focusing 
specially in the second argument, although the European Commission9 and the Portuguese 
Competition Authority10 stated that separation of the local telephone and c ble network would 
be important to promote competition in local access, there was still no official ruling by any 
regulator’s authority that obliged PT to undertake such a decision. 
So, in order to better understand this transaction, I am going to investigate if any other 
motives were important influences. 
Based on the works of Duhaime and Grant (1984) and Decker and Mellewigt (2007), the 
following factors may be individually important to influence this divestment decision: 
- Firm financial strength; 
- Unit financial strength; 
- Unit interdependency; 
- Corporate Strategy. 
Duhaime and Grant (1984) tested other factors, suchas economic growth and managerial 
attachment, but were proven less significant. Also, since PT and the majority of its peers are 
multinational companies, it would be very difficult to determine the economic growth of the 
area in which these companies operate. 
Beginning with firm financial strength, based on the existing literature, I defined the 
following measures11: 
1)  Return on equity (ROE) – averaged over the three years prior to the spin-off; 
2)  Market-to-book ratio – averaged over the three years prior to the spin-off; 
3)  Debt burden – averaged over the three years prior to the spin-off; 
4)  Dividend payout ratio – averaged over the three years prior to the spin-off. 
                                                           
8 PT Board Press Release – Portugal Telecom approves proposal to spinoff PT Multimedia, to increase the 
proposal shareholder remuneration package to Euro 3.5 billion and to contribute Euro 1.0 billion in the pension 
funds – 3rd August 2006  
9 European Electronics Communications –Regulation and Markets 2005  
10 Relatório Anual de Acompanhamento dos Mercados de Comunicações Electrónicas - 2004 
11 For the detailed formulas used in the calculation of these measures, please refer to Appendix A 
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I derive the hypothesis that PT’s financial strength was important to the decision to spin-off 
PTM. This is tested by comparing its financial performance with that of its industry peers, 
defined in chapter 4.4. However some indicators might be more important than others, and I, 
following the findings of Duhaime and Grant (1984), hypothesize that firm financial strength, 
measured by ROE, is lower than industry average and other traditional measures are not 
significant. 
The second factor tested is the unit financial strength and, it is important the emphasize that 
PTM is already an independent firm, so the same measur s applied to determine the financial 
strength of PT can also be used to measure the financial strength of the divested unit, PTM. 
Our hypothesis is that the PTM financial strength is lower than PT and so could have been a 
motivation for the spin-off. 
Unit interdependency can be measured by the levels of technology or facilities shared, but 
also by the proportion of significant items from the divesting unit’s balance sheet or income 
statement with the parent firm. In this case, I will analyze PTM’s annual report in the year 
before the spin-off and assess the importance of the transactions with PT (and firms controlled 
by PT, or on which PT has significant influence) in the year before the spin-off. I expect that 
PTM has low level of interdependency with PT and PT’s other units. 
Finally PT’s decision to divest might result from a reorientation of its corporate strategy, 
because “simultaneous investment in too many and too iverse technological field or the 
performance of redundant activities often result in inefficiency”12. In determining the relative 
importance of this motivation, I will analyze the annual reports and public statements made 
by both firms’ key personnel. I expect that a strategic reorientation of PT could be relevant in 
the decision to divest PTM. 
  
                                                           
12 Decker & Mellewigt (2007, pp.8) 
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4.2 – Spin-off impact on PT and PTM’s leverage 
On 7th November 2007 PTM was spun-off from PT. It represented significant changes in its 
organization, namely at the ownership level, operation lly and also presented some challenges 
financially.  
As it was described in the chapter 2.2, by being part of a corporate group, PTM had access to 
financing within the group and so, by leaving that structure, had to adapt the financing mix 
available. 
I analyze the quarterly evolution of leverage13 in both PT and PTM, beginning in the year 
prior to the spin-off and ending in the year after14 and compare it with both industry peers.  
This thesis, following the findings of John (1993), Johnson, Klein and Thibodeaux (1996) and 
Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakuman (1997)15, hypothesizes that leverage in both PT and PTM 
remains similar to the pre-spin-off levels instead of considering alternative theories like 
Michaely and Shaw (1995) that stated that only the spin-off parents decreased debt levels.  
4.3 – Analyzing PT and PTM capital allocation efficiency 
Existing literature argues that “one of the effects of pin-offs – or even one of the reasons they 
are undertaken in the first place – is to increase the efficiency of capital allocation”16. This 
theory is based on the assumption that financing within the group is inefficient.  
Assessing this premise, Mcneil and Moore (2005) concluded that, on average, the capital 
allocation efficiency of the parent firms remains unchanged post-spin-off. 
This thesis examines which hypothesis is true to PTM’s spin-off case by comparing each firm 
proportion of debt in the capital structure17 (Implicit Debt Level) to the proportion of debt that 
would minimize the cost of capital to each firm (Optimal Debt Level). The latter is the one 
that maximizes the use of the tax shields and the agency benefits and at the same time 
minimizes the distress and agency costs. The same clculations are made for each of PT and 
PTM industry peers to make an industry comparison. 
                                                           
13 Debt / Total Assets 
14 Since the spinoff date was 7th November 2007, I will consider the previous quarter ending date 30th September 
2007 the reference date 
15 Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar (1997) concluded that cross-industry spin-offs lead to a small decline in 
leverage ratio of the combined assets, but there is no change in leverage associated with same industry spinoffs. 
PT and PTM operate in the same industry. 
16Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2002, pp.2504) 
17 Debt level = Debt / (Debt + Market Capitalization f Equity) 
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4.3.1 - Computing the Optimal Debt Level: 
In order to determine the Optimal Debt Level for each year and each firm I made a sensitivity 
analysis testing different debt levels. I am testing 10 different debt levels (the first being 0% 
and the last being 90%) per year. Having identified the level which resulted in the lowest cost 
of capital I use the “goal seek” excel function to determine the exact optimal.  
The method used is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the calculations are 
made on a yearly basis, starting three years before the spin-off date ending three years after. 18 








	1 − ] 
where: 
E - Value of Equity; 
D - Value of Debt; 
Ke - Cost of Equity; 
Kd - Cost of Debt; 
Tc - Corporate tax rate. 
 
In the process of WACC computation I consider the following assumptions: 
- The capital structure has only two claims (Equity and Debt); 
- The Equity values considered are the market values; 
- The Debt values applied are the book values of debt19; 
- The adjustment costs of rebalancing the capital structu e are not taken in 
consideration; 
- The tax shields are limited by the EBIT value. 
- The corporate tax rate is the marginal tax rate 
In order to solve the equation for every company and every year, it is necessary to collect the 
following variables: 
E – Market value of Equity (obtained from Bloomberg); 
D – Book value of financial debt (obtained from each firm’s Annual Report and Bloomberg); 
Tc – Marginal Tax Rate (obtained from the OECD). 
                                                           
18 In this case, since the calculations are made on a yearly basis, the spinoff date considered will be 2007. 
19
 Debt = Interest bearing liabilities 
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Cost of equity 
The Cost of Equity is the rate of return investors require on an equity investment in a firm. It 
results from a trade-off between risk and return that a specific asset should grant to its holder. 
The least risky investments are treasury bills of AAA countries. By comparison, the market 
portfolio of common stocks is considered a much riskier investment and therefore investors 
require a higher return from the market portfolio than from treasury bills. 
Considering just one individual security of the market portfolio, in order to determine its risk, 
we must determine how sensitive it is to market movements. This sensitivity is called beta (β). 
Stocks with β greater than 1 tend to amplify the overall movements of the market and stocks 
with β between 0 and 1 tend to move in the same direction as the market, but not as far. If the 
β is negative, its returns tend to move in the opposite direction of the market’s returns.  
In order to estimate an accurate projection of the trade-off between risk and return of a single 
firm, I use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and this model undertakes the following 
assumptions: 
- Individual investors are price takers, therefore the security prices are not affected by 
the trades they make (perfect competition assumption); 
- Single-period investment horizon; 
- Investments are limited to traded financial assets (it rules out non-traded assets); 
- There are no taxes and transaction costs; 
- Investors are rational mean-variance optimizers; 
- There are homogeneous expectations; all investors analyze securities through the same 
lenses of cash flows distribution probabilities20. 
The model’s message is that, in a competitive market, th  expected risk premium varies 












 − " = #	 − " 
where: 
r – Expected stock return; 
rf – risk free rate; 
                                                           
20
 According to Markowitz Portfolio Theory, all investors will have the same expectations and make the sam  
choices given a particular set of circumstances. 
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rm-rf – expected risk premium on the market. 





 = " + 	#	 − " 
where: 
rf – Risk free rate  
Yield used is the one from Long term (10 years) German Government Bonds, because the 
majority of firms analyzed present their financial information in euros. 
β  
Derived by obtaining the covariance between the daily returns of the firm’s stock in the 5 
years previous to the analyzed date, with the daily market returns (in this case the Eurostoxx 
Index) in the same period. To compute the values it was used the excel formula “Slope”. 
In the WACC minimization process, I will be changin the capital structure and, by that, 
changing the applicable β. In order to compute different levels of β I will need to determine 
the Unlevered Beta (β 0), which is obtained by the following equation: 
β% =
β





Market Risk Premium – (rm –rf) 
For the country of each firm analyzed, I have identified the most important stock exchange 
index presented in table 2: 
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Table 2 - List of Stock Exchange Indexes by Country 
Country Stock Exchange Index 
Austria ATX  
Belgium BEL20 
Finland OMX Helsinki 25 




Poland WIG 20 
Portugal PSI 20 
Spain IBEX 35 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 
United States S&P 500 
 
For each index, I calculate the total return (including dividends), and compute the monthly 
market return for the longest period available (since 1990). 
Using that market return, and having obtained, via Bloomberg, the monthly risk free yield21 I 




 = 1 + ℎ()	 
,-	 − 1 
Cost of Debt 
The cost of debt measures the current cost to the firm of borrowing funds to finance itself. In 
general terms, it is defined by the following factors: 
- The risk-free rate that is being negotiated in the markets. As the riskless rate increases, 
the cost of debt for firms will also increase; 
- The entity’s default risk. As the default risk of the firm increases, the cost of 
borrowing money also increases; 
- The tax advantages of debt. If the tax shields increase, more debt in the overall capital 
structure can be used. This can, in turn, increase the cost of debt. 
The simplest scenario for estimating the cost of debt occurs when a firm only has tradable 
long term bonds (Damodaran, 2012). The cost of debtwould then be computed based on the 
market price, yield, coupon and maturity of the portfolio of bonds. 
                                                           
21Yield on the Long term (10 years) German Government Bonds  
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However, the majority of firms have bonds outstanding that do not trade on a regular basis or 
have other instruments of debt, like loans, which create hurdles when computing the cost of 
debt. 
Since the majority of larger firms are rated, it is possible to estimate their cost of debt by 
using their ratings and associated default spreads. However, many companies are not rated. 
Then there are two additional alternatives to estimate the cost of debt: 
- Recent borrowing history: by analyzing recent borrowings made by the firm and use 
these spreads to come up with a cost of debt; 
- Estimate a “synthetic rating”, based upon its financi l ratios. 
Damodaran (2012) presented this last hypothesis, and, based on information collected on the 
years 1999 and 2000 from the S&P 500 index, he was able to establish the connection 
between the interest coverage ratio (ICR)22 and the rating of the manufacturing companies of 
the S&P 500. One important distinction he made was to divide the sample between firms with 
market capitalization lower or greater than $2 billion. His conclusions are detailed in tables 3 
and 4. 
Table 3 – ICR and ratings: Low Market Cap Firms 
ICR Rating Spread 
> 12,5 AAA 0,75% 
9,5 – 12,5 AA 1% 
7,5 – 9,5 A+ 1,5% 
6 – 7,5 A 1,8% 
4,5 – 6 A- 2% 
3,5 – 4,5 BBB 2,25% 
3 – 3,5 BB 3,5% 
2,5 – 3 B+ 4,75% 
2 - 2,5 B 6,5% 
1,5 – 2 B- 8% 
1,25 – 1,5 CCC 10% 
0,8 – 1,25 CC 11,5% 
0,5 – 0,8 C 12,7% 
< 0,5 D 14% 
Source – Damodaran (2012) 
 
  
                                                           
22 EBIT/Interest Expense 
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Table 4 - ICR and ratings: High Market Cap Firms 
ICR Rating Spread 
> 8,5 AAA 0,75% 
6,5 – 8,5 AA 1% 
5,5 – 6,5 A+ 1,5% 
4,25 – 5,5 A 1,8% 
3 – 4,25 A- 2% 
2,5 – 3 BBB 2,25% 
2 – 2,5 BB 3,5% 
1,75 – 2 B+ 4,75% 
1,5 - 1,75 B 6,5% 
1,25 – 1,5 B- 8% 
0,8 – 1,25 CCC 10% 
0,65 – 0,8 CC 11,5% 
0,2 – 0,65 C 12,7% 
< 0,2 D 14% 
Source – Damodaran (2012) 
 
In this thesis I use the synthetic rating model23 to estimate the cost of debt. Although the 
majority of firms analyzed is covered by a rating agency, in the sensitivity analysis I change 
the capital structure of each entity, and so the initial rating would not be representative of the 
new capital structure obtained with each new debt lvel. 
I maintain the relation between ICR and rating estima ed by Damodaran, but I have updated 
the spread associated to each rating with the information from the Reuters Pricing Service 
(RPS) for Corporate Bond Spreads24.  
Since the information obtained from RPS calculates th  spread over the US Government 
Bonds with the same maturity I determine new spreads for each period analyzed based on the 
German Government Bonds. The updated synthetic rating tables computed are presented in 
Tables 5 and 625: 
  
                                                           
23
 Damodaran (2012) 
24 RPS bases its calculations on a database of over 20.000 bonds prices corporate bonds at a spread above an 
underlying treasury issue. 
25 The lower rating for which RPS information available was CCC  
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Table 5 - Synthetic Rating – Low Market Capitalization Firms 













> 12,5 AAA 0,13% 0,68% 0,88% 1,07% 1,65% 0,48% 0,26% 
9,5 – 12,5 AA 0,30% 0,80% 1,03% 1,27% 2,00% 1,08% 0,71% 
7,5 – 9,5 A+ 0,59% 0,93% 1,34% 1,47% 2,25% 1,28% 0,96% 
6 – 7,5 A 0,61% 0,95% 1,51% 1,62% 2,40% 1,38% 1,01% 
4,5 – 6 A- 0,63% 0,98% 1,71% 1,67% 2,45% 1,48% 1,11% 
3,5 – 4,5 BBB 0,79% 1,41% 1,86% 1,79% 2,55% 1,58% 1,16% 
3,25 – 3,5 BB+ 1,04% 1,51% 1,92% 1,97% 2,85% 1,88% 1,46% 
3 – 3,25 BB 1,17% 1,59% 2,20% 2,02% 3,15% 1,98% 1,56% 
2,5 – 3 B+ 2,10% 2,55% 2,45% 3,03% 5,45% 2,20% 1,99% 
2 - 2,5 B 2,65% 2,65% 2,90% 3,66% 6,10% 3,62% 2,49% 
1,5 – 2 B- 3,75% 3,95% 4,50% 3,76% 6,45% 4,57% 3,99% 
1,5> CCC 4,45% 4,05% 5,30% 4,23% 6,60% 10,97% 5,29% 
 
















> 8,5 AAA 0,13% 0,68% 0,88% 1,07% 1,65% 0,48% 0,26% 
6,5 – 8,5 AA 0,30% 0,80% 1,03% 1,27% 2,00% 1,08% 0,71% 
5,5 – 6,5 A+ 0,59% 0,93% 1,34% 1,47% 2,25% 1,28% 0,96% 
4,25 – 5,5 A 0,61% 0,95% 1,51% 1,62% 2,40% 1,38% 1,01% 
3 – 4,25 A- 0,63% 0,98% 1,71% 1,67% 2,45% 1,48% 1,11% 
2,5 – 3 BBB 0,79% 1,41% 1,86% 1,79% 2,55% 1,58% 1,16% 
2,25 – 2,5 BB+ 1,04% 1,51% 1,92% 1,97% 2,85% 1,88% 1,46% 
2 – 2,25 BB 1,17% 1,59% 2,20% 2,02% 3,15% 1,98% 1,56% 
1,75 – 2 B+ 2,10% 2,55% 2,45% 3,03% 5,45% 2,20% 1,99% 
1,5 – 1,75 B 2,65% 2,65% 2,90% 3,66% 6,10% 3,62% 2,49% 
1,25 – 1,5 B- 3,75% 3,95% 4,50% 3,76% 6,45% 4,57% 3,99% 
1,25> CCC 4,45% 4,05% 5,30% 4,23% 6,60% 10,97% 5,29% 
The spread will be added to the risk free rate for each period and it will determine the cost of 
debt. 
Calculating the Optimal Debt Level: 
The key input to determine the cost of debt is the ICR. Since all the firms have positive EBIT, 
in the first debt level tested26 the rating is always AAA, because as there is no debt and no 
interest expense, the ICR is always greater than 8.5 or 12.527. In the second level of debt 
(10%) I computed the WACC by analyzing if by using the AAA rating I would still have an 
                                                           
26 0% Debt  
27 Depending if it was a high or low market capitalizt on firm 
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ICR greater than 8.5 or 12.5. If that is true I would maintain the AAA rating and if it is not 
true, I would test the next rating.  
It is also important to notice that by increasing the proportion of debt in the capital structure I 
would also be increasing the β, which resulted in an increase of the cost of equity. 28 
Finally, in order to perform the necessary calculations, two additional assumptions are 
considered: 
- Ebit is independent from the capital structure and is equal to the reported in the 
income statement for each year; 
- Cost of equity must always be greater than the cost of debt. For some observations of 
the model, particularly when lower ratings were computed for low levels of debt, the 
cost of debt obtained was larger than the cost of equity. In those cases I made the 
assumption that the cost of equity would be equal to the pretax cost of debt. 
4.4 – Industry Peers – Sample selection 
In order to test the proposed methodology and to test if the results are consistent with the 
sector, I have selected a sample of industry peers for each firm. 
In the case of PT, I identify several telecommunications companies which, for the period 
covered (2004-2010), were part of the Eurostoxx Telecommunications (PT was also part of 
that index). The firms selected were29: 
- Belgacom 
- Deutsche Telekom 
- Elisa OYJ 




- Telecom Austria 
Based on the same criteria, for PTM I selected several firms from the BI Europe Cable & 
Satellite Index. However, in this case some of the firms selected were not listed in some years 
of our sample. The firms selected were: 
                                                           
28 Higher leverage enhances the variance in the net income and consequently makes the equity investment in the 
firm riskier 
29
 Telecom Italia was excluded from the sample because the risk premium computed for Italy (based on the 
Stock Exchange Index MIB30) was negative i.e. return of the risk free rate was larger than the Market R turn. 
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- Cyfrowy Polsat SA 
- Liberty Global 
- Sky Broadcasting Group 
- Telenet 
- Virgin Media 
 I considered one additional peer for PTM, Sonaecom, because it is also a Portuguese firm, 
had operated in some of the same sectors as PTM (telecommunications, internet service 
provider, and media) and also had a shareholder with controlling interest (Sonae SGPS). 
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Chapter 5 – Results 
In this chapter I present the findings from the 
outlined in Chapter 4.  
5.1 - Factors influencing PTM spin
Several motives were hypothesized to
Firm financial strength 
The first motive hypothesized to be relevant is
might have occurred when its financial strength, when compared to industry peers, was 
subpar.  
In figure 1 I compare PT’s ROE with industry peers:
Figure 
If we do not consider Belgacom, 
compares very favorably with industry peers.
The Market to Book Ratio captures
firm, compared to its book value. The results 
                                                          
30 The data used to test each motive is presented in Appendix A.
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
questions and the methodology 
-off decision: 
 influence the decision to divest30: 
 PT financial strength. The decision to spin
 
1 – ROE – PT vs Industry Peers 
who’s ROE is much larger than any other,
 
 the perception that the market has on the value of the 







 PT’s ROE 
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Figure 2 – 
PT has the third largest Market to Book ratio of firms considered and therefore it is doubtful 
that it was a motivation for the divest
Analyzing the debt burden in the year 
Figure 
PT’s debt burden is one of the 
debt, a spin-off transaction 
mention that several authors have studied the role 
decisions and concluded that when the parent firm is more financially constraint
method of divestiture is a carve
the spun-off unit has a smaller debt burden than the parent, the transaction would result in an 
increase in the parent debt burden
than PTM, so reducing PT debt burden cannot be considered a motivation to sp
Finally, the last indicator is the dividend payout ratio 
                                                          





















-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
Market to Book Ratio – PT vs Industry Peers
ment decision. 
before the spin-off the results are: 
3 – Debt Burden – PT vs Industry Peers 
largest in the sample, and in order reduce the proportion of 
might be considered a solution. However it is important to 
that financial constraints have in divestment 
-out instead of a spin-off31. It is also important to notice that if 
. It is observable in figure 7, that PT’s debt burden is larger 
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Figure 4 – Dividend Payout Ratio 
PT dividend payout ratio is the 3
significant in the spin-off decision
In conclusion, firm financial strength, by comparison with industry peers, does not appear to 
have had a strong influence in this spi
(1984) and Decker and Mellewigt (2007)
transaction. 
Unit financial strength: 
Following the same approach used to
analyze the same four indicators regarding PTM, but this time
its industry peers, I compare it to its p
PTM ROE is smaller than PT’s
company. This could be an incentive to divest, because the ROE of P
increase. 
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
– PT vs Industry Peers
rd largest in the sample and so it must not be considered 
. 
n-off decision. The findings of Duhaime and
 are not applicable in this particular spin
 assess the importance of firm financial strength
, instead of comparing PTM to 
arent firm, PT. 
Figure 5– ROE – PTM vs PT 
, which indicates that it is performing worse than the parent 
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Figure 
PTM perceived value, when compared to the equity book value
it seems to indicate that the perceived value for the market of this division is greater
the other divisions of PT. 
Based on the results presented in figure 
PT’s, so divesting PTM would worsen PT’s
as a motivation to spin-off PTM.
Figure 
Finally, PTM dividend payout ratio 





-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
6 – Market to Book Ratio – PTM vs PT 
, is much greater than PT’s, so 
7, PTM’s debt burden is significantly lower than 
 debt burden and therefore cannot be considered 
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Overall, the only indicator that could, according to the data analyzed, be considered a relevant 
factor for the occurrence of the transaction is PTM’s ROE. 
Unit interdependency 
Analyzing PTM annual report, specifically the relatd parties section, I have reviewed the 
transactions between both firms, in the year before the spin-off (2006) and the results are 
presented in table 7: 
Table 7 - Percentage of PTM Balance Sheet and Income Statemen  accounts with PT Group32 
Income Statement  2006 
Revenue 0,25% 
Cost of products sold, supplies and services 14,71% 
Interest income 23,13% 
Interest expense 16,38% 
Balance Sheet  2006 
Accounts Receivable 2,21% 
Accounts Payable 27,19% 
Debt 30,7% 
Source – PTM Annual Report 2006 
Analyzing the financial information obtained, it is observable than in key items like Revenue 
the percentage that is represented by related parties is very small. Duhaime and Grant (1984) 
defined as an indicator of low proportion of sales to the firm’ other units if it was below 10%, 
which is the case. However there are a significant number of balance sheet and income 
statement items where this threshold is surpassed, and so I concluded that there is evidence of 
significant unit interdependency.  
Corporate Strategy 
According to Decker and Mellewigt (2007, pp.4), some firms might “decide to divest 
businesses due to their misfit with Corporate Strategy”. Some companies could be too diverse 
and management, in an attempt to focus its core business, may decide to divest some of its 
divisions, in spite of being profitable.  
Analyzing this particular situation and bearing in mind that in April 2nd 2008, less than six 
months after the spin-off, PT launched its triple play offer service “Meo”, that would 
essentially operate in the same businesses that PTM was operating (television, internet and 
telephone), it would make sense to disregard corporate strategy as a factor in the decision to 
spin-off PTM. Furthermore, since there was pressure from both local and European regulators 
                                                           
32 PT Group Firms considered: PT Comunicações, PT SGPS, PT Contact, PT Pro and PT SI 
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to separate the cable and telephone networks
consequence of that pressure and not as a strategic decision by the firm
However, although there was pressure from the regulators, there was no offici
forced PT to sell one of its networks. Also 
before the decision to spin-off
be able to compete in all of the business segments tha  they 
In addition, by choosing to spin
industry instead of a potentially increase in the market share of an already established 
competitor, which minimizes the negative impact for PT
Finally, PT was facing a hostile takeover offer and by making the spin
failure, PT’s Board was giving t
So, based on the arguments presented, the decision to separate PTM from PT via
could be considered a corporate strategy decision.
5.2 - Spin-off impact on PT and PTM’s leverage
In this section I analyze the impact of the transaction in both firms leverage as outlined in 
chapter 4.2.  
Having computed the information quarterly I present 
Figure 
My findings suggest that after the spin
began in the first quarter of 2007. 
16,05 %. Analyzing the industry peers, leverage 
but at a slower pace. 
                                                          
33 Martins (2014) 
34 Tables B1 to B6 of the Appendix B outline the data used to assess the spin
leverage 
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
, this decision could have been easily seen as a 
. 
“Meo” technology was already being developed
 PTM was announced33 so, even without PTM, PT would still 
considered core.
-off PTM instead of selling, the result was a new player in the 
. 
-off conditional to its 
he shareholders an incentive to refuse the offer.
 
. 
the results for PT in figure 
9 – Δ Leverage – PT vs Industry Peers 
-off, PT’s debt level had a significant increase
One year after the spin-off date, he accumulated increase is 
had increased after the PTM’s spin
-off impact on PT and PTM’s 
 
Page 33 
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Figure 
Analyzing the evolution of PTM’s leverage
leverage has more than doubled. This increase started in the second quarter of 2008. PTM’s 
industry peers leverage also recorded 
off), but at a much smaller pace.
So, the results do not support the
significantly, because in both PT and PTM it incr
5.3 - PT and PTM capital allocation efficiency
Finally, analyzing the spin-off impact in the capital allocation efficiency
PT’s, figure 11 compares year end 
2010, calculated according to 
Figure 11
Analyzing the Implicit Debt Level
increased following the spin-
Euro 5.5 billion to Euro 7.2 bil
                                                          
35 Detailed results of the model outlined in Chapter 4.3 are presented in Appendix C for PT, PTM and both firms 
industry peers. 
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
10– Δ Leverage – PTM vs Industry Peers 
, it is observable that one year after the spin
a significant increase (42,08 % in the year after the spin
 
 initial hypothesis that the leverage would not change 
eased at a faster pace than its industry peers.
 
35 and beginning with 
PT’s Implicit and Optimal Debt Level since 2004 until 
the methodology described in chapter 4.3. 
 – PT – Optimal and Implicit Debt Level 
, the proportion of debt in the capital structure has 
off. It resulted from an increase in the debt








 held by PT, from 
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the Market Capitalization of the firm (it was worth 
7.3 billion in 2010)36.  
The Optimal Debt Level of PT, before 2007, had no defined tendency
recorded a significant decrease. 
(figure 12) and by the decrease in the risk premium
Since the key variable in this model 
and, as a consequence, for the same debt level the cost of debt will be relatively higher than in 
a year with higher EBIT. Simultaneously
2007 (particularly in 2008 and 2009)
the years after the spin-off. So, combining these effects, for the same debt l vel the cost of 
debt was higher and the cost of equity was lower, which in turn resulted 
proportion of debt in the optimal capital struct
It is important to emphasize that EBIT explains this trajectory only because the size of the 
company37 remained very similar between 2007 and 2010
in EBIT was simultaneous with the decrease in the capital structure
would also be lower (as debt considered in each level would also have been lower).
In figure 13, it is present PT’s industry peers Optimal and Implicit Debt Levels:
                                                          
36 As per “Table C2” in the Appendix C
37 For this purpose, size of the company means debt plus market capitalization of equity.
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
Euro 10.1 billion in 2004 and only Euro 
 but after 2007 it has 
This decrease is explained by the decline in 
.  
Figure 12 - PT EBIT 2004 - 2010 
 
is the ICR, as EBIT decreases, the 
, the risk premium was also l wer in the years after 
. As a result, the cost of equity was comparably lower in 
re. 
 (has decreased 4%






ICR also decreases 
in the lowering of 
). If the decrease 
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Figure 13 - PT’s Industry Peers (Average) 
In this case, and except for the year 2009
its implicit debt level and also significantly higher than PT’s 
So the evidence analyzed suggests that
significantly after the spin-off. 
capital allocation efficiency, 
PTM’s operations were not very significant in the 
Total Assets accounted for less than 7% of PT Group Total Assets
market segments on which PTM 
(it had a 74% Market share in 2006) and Internet Servics Provider
share in 2006). 
So, by separating PTM from its g
considered core businesses to the company
consequence lowered its profitability.
contributors to the decrease in the optimal debt level
relation between PTM´s spin-off and the increased 
Analyzing PTM’s Capital Allocation Efficiency
                                                          
38PT and PTM Annual Reports 2006
39Anacom’s - Situação das Telecomunicações 2007
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
– Optimal and Implicit Debt Level
, the optimal debt level has always been higher than 
optimal debt level.
 PT’s capital allocation efficiency worsened 
In order to understand the role that this transaction 
it is necessary to considered that although the relative size of 
context of the PT Group (i
38), it operated in profitable 
had significant market share39, mainly TV cable and s
 (it 
roup structure, PT lost significant presence in twomarkets 
, i creased the competition lev
 As the decrease of the EBIT was 
, it might be possible to 









had on PT’s 
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had a 36% Market 
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one of the main 
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Figure 14
In figure 14 it is observable that the proportion of debt in thecapital structure increased 
significantly after the spin-off. Similarly to PT, it was
the firm and the decrease in the market capitalization
more significant progression (PTM’s debt increased from 
billion in 2010 and market capitalization decreased from 
billion in 2010)40.  
In terms of Optimal Debt Level
profitability, as measured by EBIT 
PTM’s market capitalization was below the threshold
considered a low market cap firm
(for example in 2007 a PTM’s AAA rating implied tha the 
after 2007 in order to be rated AAA PTM’s 
profitability increased significantly after 2007
implied by each rating, as compared to previous years
remained stable. 
                                                          
40 As per “Table C13” in the Appendix C.
41 And as it was the case in PT the capital structure of the firm remained very similar in those years.
42 As per “Table C13” in the Appendix C.
43 This increase is explained almost entirely by the decrease in the size of the company and a small increase in 
the EBIT.  
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
 – PTM – Optimal and Implicit Debt Level 
 the result of the increase in d
. However, in PTM’s 
Euro 0.3 billion 
Euro 3.0 billion in 2007 to 
, PTM’s decline after 2005 is related to the de
in the years 2006 and 200741 and also because after 2007 
 of $2 billion and started being 
42. As a consequence, ach rating implied an increased 
ICR was greater than 8.5 , but 
ICR had to be greater than 12,5). So even 
43 that effect was offset by the increased 
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Figure 15 - PTM’s Industry Peers 
Analyzing PTM’s industry peers
and since then it has decreased. Their optimal d
PTM’s and was, over the period covered
The year 2007 marked a change in the PTM’s capital alloc ti n efficiency. Until
proportion of debt in the capital structure was very low and the optimal debt level, which 
started significantly higher than the implicit level, was closing the gap. After 2007
the increased proportion of debt in the capital structu
significantly and the optimal debt l
So, my findings on both companies are contrary to the hypo
because the PTM spin-off had a significant impact on both 
their efficiency. 
-offs: The case of PT Multimedia
(Average) – Optimal and Implicit Debt Level
, their implicit debt level increased significantly until 2008
ebt level had a more stable progression
, always lower than the implicit debt level
e, the implicit debt level increased 
evel remained similar to before. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze PTM’s spin-off and understand its implications on 
the capital structure of PTM and its former parent firm PT. 
In order to better understand the transaction, first I analyze the factors influencing the spin-off 
decision. Based on the existing literature, and in addition to the factors identified by PT’s 
Board, I hypothesize four factors (firm financial strength, unit financial strength, unit 
interdependency and corporate strategy) and assess it  relevance to the transaction. 
In terms of financial strength, I have tested four measures (ROE, Market-to-Book ratio, Debt 
Burden and Dividend Payout ratio) and the rational considered is that if PT’s performance on 
those measures was below the industry average (assessed by comparing PT’s results with the 
results obtained by its industry peers in the period leading to the spin-off) it might have had 
relevance to the decision. Based on that premise, none of the measures of firm financial 
strength could be considered an influence for this sp n-off. 
Analyzing unit financial strength, since PTM was alre dy an independent unit, the measures 
considered are the same that were used to assess PT’s financial strength. However, instead of 
comparing PTM’s results with its industry peers, I compare them relatively to its parent 
company, PT. The findings show that only PTM’s ROE was lower than PT. None of the other 
variables could be a factor supporting the need for a spin-off.  
Unit interdependency is also hypothesized as a factor only if the proportion of significant 
PTM’s balance sheet and income statement items with PT was low in the year before the spin-
off. For the purpose of this thesis if the proportion was lower than 10% it is considered an 
indicator of low unit interdependency. For several items, on both PTM’s balance sheet and 
income statement, the proportion with PT was larger than the threshold established, thus I 
conclude that this factor was not significant. 
Finally, the last factor is corporate strategy. It is hypothesized that if the transaction resulted 
from a reorientation of PT’s corporate strategy, it could be considered a factor. Based on this 
thesis findings I have considered corporate strategy to be a significant factor, because PT was, 
before the spin-off was announced, already developing a new technology “Meo” to compete 
in the same market segments as PTM. So PT, without being forced by any regulator, decided 
to separate itself from PTM and chose the technology they considered best to operate in the 
market. By choosing to spin-off instead of selling the firm to an already established 
competitor PT was able to persuade the shareholders to reject the hostile takeover by Sonae 
and strategically reposition PT in all of the sectors considered core businesses. 
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As a conclusion, besides increasing the remuneration package so that PT’s shareholders 
would not accept Sonae’s offer and regulatory pressur , the only other factors that might have 
influenced the decision to spin-off PTM were unit financial strength, as measured by ROE, 
and corporate strategy. 
Analyzing the impact on leverage, I observe that in he year after the spin-off, both firms 
leverage increased significantly. Although both firms’ industry peers leverage also recorded 
an increase, its growth rate was lower. Based on the literature, I hypothesized that both firms’ 
leverage would remain similar to its pre-spin-off level, and so the conclusion disproves this 
hypothesis. 
Finally, in terms of capital allocation efficiency, based on the sensitivity analyses performed, I 
conclude that PT and PTM’s optimal debt level decreased significantly after the spin-off, 
while its implicit debt level increased substantially, thus deteriorating the capital allocation 
efficiency in both cases.  
In PT’s case, until 2007 both optimal and implicit debt levels had no defined tendency but in 
2007 they were very similar. After 2007, the implicit debt level increased, and optimal debt 
level decreased substantially. The decrease in optimal debt level can be explained in part by 
the spin-off, due to the decline in profitability. 
PTM had significant market share in the segments in which it operated. By separating PTM 
from its group structure, PT lost significant presenc  in two markets and also increased the 
competition (after the spin-off PTM started operating in mobile and telephone services), 
lowering its profitability as a consequence. PT’s industry peers optimal and implicit debt 
levels were very stable throughout the period covered and only in 2009 was the optimal debt 
level lower than the implicit debt level.  
Finally, PTM optimal debt level had decreased significantly until 2006 and has remained 
relatively stable (and low) after. The implicit debt level had until 2007 remained relatively 
low, but after it has recorded a very significant increase due to the increase in the debt held by 
the firm and, more importantly, because of the declin  in the market capitalization. As a 
consequence, after 2007 the capital allocation effici ncy deteriorated and just like PT it can be 
explained by the spin-off. Investors could perceive PTM individually as a less valuable firm, 
comparing to the same company operating in the context of PT’s group.  
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Chapter 7 – Limitations 
The main limitation of this thesis is related to the model used to assess the capital allocation 
efficiency. The model designed by Damodaran (2012) to estimate synthetic ratings is based 
on the relation between the Interest Coverage Ratio and Ratings for manufacturing firms in 
the S&P Index in the years 1999 and 2000. If I were to update the model to the years 2004 to 
2010 or if I considered firms’ members of the Eurostoxx instead, I could have reached 
different results.  
However, this thesis goal was to better understand he motives and consequences of PTM 
spinoff. So, testing Damodaran’s model under different scenarios was considered not directly 
relevant to achieve them. One possible direction for future research would be to investigate if 
the relationship between Interest Coverage Ratio and Ratings derived by Damodaran (2012) 
holds in different periods and with firms from other stock market indexes. 
When determining the optimal debt level, I calculate the interest expense based on the firms 
synthetic rating. If I were to compare the firm’s implicit interest expense with the one 
obtained by the model, for the same debt level, it is possible that there could be some 
difference between them, because the firm’s implicit interest expense is comprised by several 
different debt instruments, issued at different times and with different interest rates, while the 
debt level estimated by the model considers that the entire debt level of the firm was 
negotiated with the market conditions available in the same period. 
Finally, the number of peers selected, particularly in the case of PTM, was very limited and 
for some firms of the sample there was no available information for every period. If the 
comparison of the capital allocation efficiency was performed with a higher number of 
industry peers, the benchmark to PT and PTM results could have been different. However, by 
selecting the peers from the same stock market sector indexes I tried to ensure that I would 
only compare similar firms, in terms of revenue sources and business environment and by 
expanding the number of peers I could have not achieved that goal.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Factors influencing the spinoff 















Table A1 – ROE – PT, PTM and PT’s Industry Peers 
Firms 














Belgacom 1.074 2.629 41% 1.098 2.591 42% 1.094 2.399 46% 42,94% 
Deutsche Telekom 1.594 45.803 3% 5.589 48.599 12% 3.165 49.670 6% 7,12% 
Elisa OYJ 159 915 17% 178 1.350 13% 161 1.312 12% 14,28% 
Hellenic Telecom. 133 4.412 3% (217) 4.513 (5%) 575 4.889 12% 3,32% 
KPN 1.757 6.411 27% 1.454 5.104 28% 1.583 4.196 38% 31,21% 
Orange 3.200 17.683 18% 6.360 28.438 22% 4.768 31.368 15% 18,51% 
Telefonica 3.354 12.342 27% 4.827 16.158 30% 6.579 20.001 33% 29,98% 
Telekom Austria 228 2.742 8% 409 2.919 14% 562 2.824 20% 14,07% 
Average44  20%  20%  24% 21,25% 
PT 725 2.254 32% 689 2.582 27% 954 3.106 31% 29,86% 
PTM 123 509 24% 113 439 26% 74 424 17% 22,46% 
Source: Bloomberg, Portugal Telecom and Portugal Telecom Multimedia Annual Reports (2004-2007) 
Values in €M 














Table A2 – MB – PT, PTM and PT’s Industry Peers 
Firms 












Equity MB MB 
Belgacom 11.152 2.629 4,24 9.378 2.591 3,62 11.144 2.399 4,65 4,17 
Deutsche Telekom 69.878 45.803 1,53 59.109 48.599 1,22 60.576 49.670 1,22 1,32 
Elisa OYJ 1.681 915 1,84 2.596 1.350 1,92 3.360 1.312 2,56 2,11 
Hellenic Telecom. 6.486 4.412 1,47 8.831 4.513 1,96 11.156 4.889 2,28 1,90 
KPN 16.283 6.411 2,54 18.222 5.104 3,57 20.584 4.196 4,91 3,67 
Orange 60.104 17.683 3,40 54.638 28.438 1,92 54.610 31.368 1,73 2,35 
Telefonica 91.951 12.342 7,45 94.908 16.158 5,87 78.109 20.001 3,91 5,74 
Telekom Austria 9.748 2.742 3,56 12.366 2.919 4,24 9.372 2.824 3,32 3,70 
Average  3,39  3,11  3,12 3,21 
PT 10.111 2.254 4,49 9.539 2.582 3,69 10.905 3.106 3,51 3,90 
PTM 2.858 509 5,61 2.974 439 6,78 3.008 424 7,09 6,49 
Source: Bloomberg, Portugal Telecom and Portugal Telecom Multimedia Annual Reports (2004-2007) 









                                                           
44 Excluding PT and PTM 
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Table A3 – Debt Burden – PT, PTM and PT’s Industry Peers 
Firms 
2006 
Debt Book Equity Debt Burden 
Belgacom 1.988 2.399 0,83 
Deutsche Telekom 46.482 49.670 0,94 
Elisa OYJ 399 1.312 0,30 
Hellenic Telecom. 4.591 4.889 0,94 
KPN 9.068 4.196 2,16 
Orange 38.886 31.368 1,23 
Telefonica 59.057 20.001 2,95 
Telekom Austria 3.307 2.824 1,19 
Average  1,38 
PT 5.840 3.106 1,88 
PTM 266 424 0,63 
Source: Bloomberg, Portugal Telecom and Portugal Telecom Multimedia Annual Reports (2004-2007) 
Values in €M 
Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR): 
9















Table A4 – DPR – PT, PTM and Pt’s Industry Peers 
Firms 
2004 2005 2006 Average 
Dividends Net 
Income 
DPR Dividends Net 
Income. 
DPR Dividends Net 
Income. 
DPR DPR 
Belgacom 500 1.074 47% 534 1.098 49% 684 1.094 63% 52,56% 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
2.600 1.594 163% 3.005 5.589 54% 3.124 3.165 98% 105,19% 
Elisa OYJ 123 159 78% 116 178 65% 243 161 151% 97,92% 
Hellenic 
Telecom. 
0 133 0% 0 (217) 0% 270 575 47% 15,64% 
KPN 799 1.757 45% 943 1.454 65% 971 1.583 61% 57,22% 
Orange 1.184 3.200 37% 2.603 6.360 41% 2.602 4.768 55% 44,17% 
Telefonica 973 3.354 29% 1.083 4.827 22% 2.934 6.579 45% 32,01% 
Telekom 
Austria 
119 228 52% 261 409 64% 346 562 62% 59,17% 
Average  56%  48%  71% 58,40% 
PT 395 725 54% 526 689 75% 517 954 125% 87,72% 
PTM 77 123 63% 85 113 76% 93 74 54% 61,67% 
Source: Bloomberg, Portugal Telecom and Portugal Telecom Multimedia Annual Reports (2004-2007) 
Values in €M 
Unit interdependency: 











Transactions PTM % 
Income Statement 
Revenue 1 641 666 483 0,25% 
Cost of products sold, supplies and services 58 502 397 726 14,71% 
Interest income 461 1 991 23,13% 
Interest expense 1 662 10 146 16,38% 
Balance Sheet 
Accounts receivable 5 871 265 620 2,21% 
Accounts payable 51 087 187 899 27,19% 
Debt 81 555 265 620 30,70% 
Source: Portugal Telecom Multimedia Annual Reports (2006) 
Values in 000’€ 
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Appendix B: Spin-off impact on PT and PTM’s leverage  
Table B1- Debt - PT and Industry Peers  
Values in €M Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Belgacom 397 1.988 1.983 1.971 1.971 1.964 1.971 1.946 2.015 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
44.148 46.482 46.709 45.623 43.127 42.906 42.507 46.501 46.575 
Elisa OYJ 375 399 722 678 678 755 998 913 912 
Hellenic 
Telecom 
4.197 4.591 4.071 4.065 4.043 5.528 6.114 6.064 6.060 
KPN 10.103 9.068 8.783 9.815 10.351 11.755 11.377 11.605 12.782 
Orange - 38.886 - 44.738 - 41.380 - 42.525 - 
Telefonica 60.622 59.057 58.297 56.412 53.820 53.928 52.185 53.064 52.874 
Telekom 
Austria 
3.132 3.370 3.191 3.534 3.656 4.080 3.901 4.050 3.790 
PT 5.772 5.840 5.049 5.632 5.786 6.217 6.048 6.922 7.071 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Table B2– Total Assets – PT and Industry Peers 
Values in €M Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Belgacom 6.080 7.300 7.471 7.058 7.362 7.325 7.362 7.017 7.294 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
124.440 130.160 129.435 124.508 120.749 120.673 118.369 120.126 123.385 
Elisa OYJ 2.052 2.091 2.206 2.108 2.168 2.176 2.113 2.046 2.043 
Hellenic 
Telecom 
12.050 12.549 12.264 12.468 12.011 11.699 11.415 11.518 11.201 
KPN 22.394 21.258 21.104 20.802 20.734 24.797 24.519 24.226 24.440 
Orange - 103.171 - 100.756 - 101.183 - 98.991 - 
Telefonica 109.554 108.982 107.065 106.855 105.623 105.873 101.761 103.867 105.583 
Telekom 
Austria 
7.304 7.560 7.387 7.506 7.559 9.004 8.734 8.714 8 770 
PT 13.788 14.171 13.731 13.469 13.578 13.122 12.069 13.347 14.300 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Table B3 - Leverage – PT and Industry Peers - Quarterly variation (accumulated) 
 Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Belgacom (76%) 2% (1%) 4% 0% 0% 0% 4% 3% 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
(1%) 0% 1% 3% 0% 0% 1% 8% 6% 
Elisa OYJ (42%) (39%) 5% 3% 0% 11% 51% 43% 43% 
Hellenic 
Telecom 
3% 9% (1%) (3%) 0% 40% 59% 56% 61% 
KPN (10%) (15%) (17%) (6%) 0% (5%) (7%) (4%) 5% 
Orange (10%) - (15%) - 0% - (8%) - (3%) 
Telefonica (9%) (6%) (7%) (3%) 0% 0% 1% 0% (2%) 
Telekom 
Austria 
(11%) (8%) (11%) (3%) 0% (6%) (8%) (4%) (11%) 
Average (15%) (6%) (5%) 0% 0% 6% 12% 16% 13% 
PT (2%) (3%) (14%) (2%) 0% 11% 18% 22% 16% 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Table B4 - Debt - PTM and Industry Peers 
Values in €M Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Liberty 
Global 
8.888 9.273 10.703 11.639 11.436 12.586 12.350 12.574 13.694 
Telenet 1.307 1.406 1.410 1.302 1.270 2.018 2.015 2.005 2.084 
Virgin Media 9.158 9.042 9.069 9.034 8.744 8.101 7.558 7.621 7.844 
Sonaecom 464 464 463 464 308 394 330 356 367 
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Table B5 - – Total Assets – PTM and Industry Peers 
Values in €M Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Liberty 
Global 
18.733 19.387 21.302 21.907 21.823 22.368 21.986 21.537 22.658 
Telenet 2.418 2.592 2.611 2.626 2.687 2.665 2.639 2.686 2.741 
Virgin Media 16.515 16.507 16.254 16.132 15.434 14.230 13.018 12.608 12.617 
Sonaecom 1.489 1.720 1.676 1.693 1.603 1.759 1.695 1.796 1.808 
PTM 970 975 936 929 943 1.000 1.053 1.220 1.359 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table B6 - - Leverage – PTM and Industry Peers - Quarterly variation (accumulated) 
 Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Liberty Global (9%) (9%) (4%) 1% 0% 7% 7% 11% 15% 
BSKY - (8%) - 0% 0% (3%) - 13% - 
Telenet 14% 15% 14% 5% 0% 60% 62% 58% 61% 
Virgin Media (2%) (3%) (2%) (1%) 0% 0% 2% 7% 10% 
Sonaecom 62% 40% 44% 30% 0% 16% 1% 3% 6% 
Average 13% 7% 9% 1% 0% 14% 12% 16% 39% 
PTM (1%) (10%) (9%) (30%) 0% 0% (11%) 7% 103% 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Appendix C: PT and PTM capital allocation efficiency 
PT and Industry Peers – Implicit Debt Level: 
Table C1 - PT and Industry Peers – Implicit Debt Level: 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belgacom 3,14% 4,16% 15,14% 14,91% 22,36% 21,06% 21,32% 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
42,23% 44,15% 43,42% 39,56% 49,84% 53,29% 54,78% 
Elisa OYJ 27,10% 16,31% 10,62% 18,52% 30,62% 23,18% 24,18% 
Hellenic 
Telecom 
32,90% 28,03% 29,15% 30,92% 50,90% 51,81% 63,82% 
KPN 35,38% 33,69% 30,58% 34,55% 40,36% 40,94% 42,20% 
Orange 47,98% 49,34% 41,59% 39,13% 43,16% 44,33% 46,66% 
Telefonica 23,15% 26,61% 43,06% 34,01% 42,29% 38,96% 44,41% 
Telekom 
Austria 
24,48% 21,22% 26,44% 32,65% 46,17% 48,16% 43,59% 
Average 29,55% 27,94% 30,00% 30,53% 40,71% 40,22% 42,62% 
PT 35,32% 44,29% 34,88% 40,92% 55,74% 48,57% 49,54% 
Table C2 - PT – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 10.111 9.539 10.905 8.976 5.317 7.462 7.340 
D 5.522 7.584 5.840 6.218 6.696 7.046 7.206 
D+E 15.633 17.123 16.745 15.194 12.012 14.508 14.546 
D/(D+E) 35,32% 44,29% 34,88% 40,92% 55,74% 48,57% 49,54% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C3 - Belgacom – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 11.152 9.378 11.144 11.204 8.755 8.197 8.077 
D 361 407 1.988 1.964 2.521 2.187 2.189 
D+E 11.513 9.785 13.132 13.168 11.276 10.384 10.266 
D/(D+E) 3,14% 4,16% 15,14% 14,91% 22,36% 21,06% 21,32% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C4 - Deutsche Telekom – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 69.878 59.109 60.576 65.550 46.884 44.878 41.722 
D 51.090 46.721 46.482 42.906 46.594 51.191 50.546 
D+E 120.968 105.830 107.058 108.456 93.478 96.069 92.268 
D/(D+E) 42,23% 44,15% 43,42% 39,56% 49,84% 53,29% 54,78% 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Table C5 - Elisa OYJ – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 1.681 2.596 3.360 3.323 1.914 2.484 2.534 
D 625 506 399 755 845 750 808 
D+E 2.307 3.102 3.759 4.079 2.759 3.233 3.343 
D/(D+E) 27,10% 16,31% 10,62% 18,52% 30,62% 23,18% 24,18% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C6 - Hellenic Telecom – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 6.486 8.831 11.156 12.352 5.833 5.044 3.005 
D 3.181 3.440 4.591 5.528 6.048 5.422 5.300 
D+E 9.666 12.270 15.746 17.880 11.881 10.466 8.304 
D/(D+E) 32,90% 28,03% 29,15% 30,92% 50,90% 51,81% 63,82% 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Table C7 - KPN – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 16.283 18.222 20.584 22.270 17.795 19.286 17.173 
D 8.913 9.258 9.068 11.755 12.041 13.371 12.537 
D+E 25.196 27.480 29.652 34.025 29.836 32.657 29.710 
D/(D+E) 35,38% 33,69% 30,58% 34,55% 40,36% 40,94% 42,20% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C9 - Orange – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 60.104 54.638 54.610 64.365 51.993 46.131 41.309 
D 55.445 53.225 38.886 41.380 39.478 36.732 36.142 
D+E 115.549 107.863 93.496 105.745 91.471 82.863 77.451 
D/(D+E) 47,98% 49,34% 41,59% 39,13% 43,16% 44,33% 46,66% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C10 - Telefonica – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 91.951 94.908 78.109 104.635 72.584 88.966 76.492 
D 27.703 34.403 59.057 53.928 53.188 56.791 61.100 
D+E 119.653 129.312 137.166 158.563 125.772 145.757 137.592 
D/(D+E) 23,15% 26,61% 43,06% 34,01% 42,29% 38,96% 44,41% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C11 - Telekom Austria – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 9.748 12.366 9.372 8.415 4.557 4.404 4.656 
D 3.159 3.330 3.370 4.080 3.909 4.091 3.598 
D+E 12.908 15.697 12.742 12.495 8.465 8.494 8.254 
D/(D+E) 24,48% 21,22% 26,44% 32,65% 46,17% 48,16% 43,59% 
Source: Bloomberg 
PTM and Industry Peers – Implicit Debt Level: 
Table C12 - PTM and Industry Peers – Implicit Debt Level: 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BSKY 7,79% 17,07% 20,29% 17,21% 27,69% 17,15% 18,05% 
Cyfrowdy - - - - 3,01% 1,32% 0,44% 
Liberty Global - 56,34% 58,81% 64,87% 86,29% 85,71% 72,35% 
Sonaecom 26,86% 29,82% 20,15% 24,56% 52,42% 35,52% 42,58% 
Telenet - 47,72% 38,84% 48,10% 64,59% 51,88% 46,47% 
Virgin Media 44,68% 43,60% 59,58% 67,79% 84,60% 63,41% 51,69% 
Average 26,44% 34,55% 34,71% 39,42% 57,32% 41,99% 39,70% 
PTM 8,41% 5,76% 8,11% 8,20% 42,97% 43,09% 50,42% 
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Table C13 - PTM – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 2.857 2.974 3.008 2.952 1.094 1.280 1.048 
D 262 182 266 264 824 969 1.066 
D+E 3.119 3.156 3.273 3.215 1.918 2.249 2.113 
D/(D+E) 8,41% 5,76% 8,11% 8,20% 42,97% 43,09% 50,42% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C14 - BSKY – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 10.784 9.851 9.033 10.272 9.171 11.218 10.850 
D 911 2.028 2.299 2.136 3.511 2.322 2.390 
D+E 11.695 11.879 11.332 12.408 12.682 13.540 13.240 
D/(D+E) 7,79% 17,07% 20,29% 17,21% 27,69% 17,15% 18,05% 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Table C15 - Cyfrowdy – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2008 2009 2010 
E 875 889 1.119 
D 27 12 5 
D+E 902 901 1.124 
D/(D+E) 3,01% 1,32% 0,44% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C16 - Liberty Global – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 6.625 6.494 6.817 2.335 3.008 6.422 
D 8.548 9.273 12.586 14.694 18.040 16.806 
D+E 15.173 15.767 19.402 17.029 21.048 23.228 
D/(D+E) 56,34% 58,81% 64,87% 86,29% 85,71% 72,35% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C17 - Sonaecom – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 860 1.085 1.839 1.209 368 694 482 
D 316 461 464 394 406 382 357 
D+E 1.176 1.546 2.303 502 774 1.076 839 
D/(D+E) 26,86% 29,82% 20,15% 24,56% 52,42% 35,52% 42,58% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C18 - Telenet – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 1.583 2.215 2.178 1.357 2.198 3.314 
D 1.445 1.406 2.018 2.475 2.370 2.878 
D+E 3.028 3.621 4.196 3.832 4.568 6.192 
D/(D+E) 47,72% 38,84% 48,10% 64,59% 51,88% 46,47% 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table C19 - Virgin Media – Implicit Debt Level: 
Values in €M 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
E 3.178 4.284 6.133 3.849 1.173 3.885 6.562 
D 2.567 3.312 9.042 8.101 6.445 6.732 7.023 
D+E 5.745 7.595 15.176 11.950 7.619 10.617 13.585 
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values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 15,25% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745 16 745
Interest 0 94 143 203 323 444 872 1 403 1 636 1 870 2 104
Ebit 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214 1 214
Rating AAA AAA AAA A+ A- BBB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,97 8,50 5,99 3,76 2,73 1,39 0,87 0,74 0,65 0,58
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93%
β0 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54
βl 0,54 0,58 0,61 0,64 0,71 0,80 0,93 1,12 1,45 2,10 4,05
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 5,59% 6,05% 6,42% 6,63% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 4,05% 4,05% 4,05% 4,39% 4,65% 4,81% 7,55% 10,64% 11,11% 11,47% 11,75%
re 5,52% 5,65% 5,73% 5,81% 6,01% 6,29% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 15,81%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 5,52% 5,49% 5,47% 5,52% 5,61% 5,69% 8,98% 11,97% 11,97% 11,97% 12,15%
2006
PT and Industry Peers – Optimal Debt Level 
Table C20 - PT and Industry Peers – Optimal Debt Level 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belgacom 98,12% 99,99% 53,25% 55,85% 79,34% 34,72% 99,99% 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
50,23% 60,92% 57,72% 28,20% 45,13% 21,49% 62,68% 
Elisa OYJ 67,96% 25,70% 35,63% 47,01% 68,95% 51,69% 60,74% 
Hellenic 
Telecom 
46,13% 1,21% 35,88% 37,30% 29,94% 28,55% 16,91% 
KPN 70,62% 52,75% 42,66% 43,01% 26,45% 23,78% 36,25% 
Orange 55,06% 62,26% 67,34% 61,66% 82,66% 62,39% 86,34% 
Telefonica 41,68% 41,08% 41,44% 56,35% 78,71% 58,70% 90,71% 
Telekom 
Austria 
25,71% 0,00% 12,94% 42,74% 5,04% 11,04% 23,30% 
Average 56,94% 42,99% 43,36% 46,51% 52,03% 36,55% 59,62% 
PT 66,70% 64,06% 15,25% 47,54% 26,24% 13,82% 12,52% 
Table C21 - PT Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C22- PT Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 








D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 66,70% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633 15.633
Interest 0 64 128 199 285 358 430 478 546 1.270 1.428
Ebit 1.434 1.434 1.434 1.434 1.434 1.434 1.434 1.434 1.434 1.434 1. 34
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BBB CCC CCC
ICR ? 22,46 11,23 7,19 5,02 4,00 3,34 3,00 2,62 1,13 1,00
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36%
β0 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57
βl 0,57 0,62 0,67 0,75 0,85 0,98 1,19 1,40 1,54 2,23 4,29
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,08% 4,08% 4,08% 4,25% 4,56% 4,58% 4,58% 4,58% 4,99% 10,15%0,15%
kd 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 3,08% 3,31% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,62% 7,36% 7,36%
re 4,46% 4,52% 4,60% 4,70% 4,84% 5,02% 5,30% 5,59% 5,77% 10,15%0,15%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 4,46% 4,37% 4,27% 4,22% 4,22% 4,17% 4,12% 4,08% 4,27% 7,92% 7,64%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 64,06% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123 17 123
Interest 0 70 139 215 297 374 449 480 892 1 033 1 317
Ebit 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436 1 436
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- B B- CCC
ICR ∞ 20,59 10,29 6,67 4,83 3,84 3,20 2,99 1,61 1,39 1,09
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37%
β0 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
βl 0,50 0,54 0,59 0,66 0,74 0,86 1,04 1,15 1,35 1,95 3,76
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,07% 4,07% 4,07% 4,19% 4,34% 4,37% 4,37% 4,37% 7,44% 7,54% 8,54%
kd 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 3,04% 3,15% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 5,40% 5,47% 6,19%
re 4,50% 4,59% 4,71% 4,86% 5,07% 5,36% 5,79% 6,03% 6,50% 7,93% 12,23%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 4,50% 4,43% 4,36% 4,32% 4,30% 4,26% 4,22% 4,20% 5,73% 5,96% 6,80%
2005
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Table C24 - PT Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C25 - PT Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C26 - PT Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C27 - PT Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 47,54% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194 15 194
Interest 0 77 161 257 346 411 455 752 931 1 161 1 306
Ebit 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234 1 234
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- BBB B B- CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 15,94 7,67 4,80 3,57 3,00 2,71 1,64 1,33 1,06 0,94
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32%
β0 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42
βl 0,42 0,45 0,49 0,55 0,62 0,69 0,72 0,87 1,13 1,64 3,16
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,29% 5,64% 5,69% 5,69% 5,99% 8,25% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,74% 3,74% 3,89% 4,15% 4,18% 4,18% 4,41% 6,07% 6,43% 7,02% 7,16%
re 5,69% 5,80% 5,94% 6,12% 6,36% 6,60% 6,70% 7,21% 8,05% 9,74% 14,81%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 5,69% 5,59% 5,53% 5,53% 5,49% 5,45% 5,55% 6,52% 6,92% 7,57% 7,93%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 26,24% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012 12.012
Interest 0 47 93 122 161 222 281 366 792 997 1.121
Ebit 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037 1.037
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA A+ A A- BBB B- CCC CCC
ICR ? 22,30 11,15 8,50 6,44 4,67 3,70 2,84 1,31 1,04 0,93
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13%
β0 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41 0,41
βl 0,41 0,44 0,48 0,51 0,54 0,61 0,71 0,86 1,11 1,61 3,11
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,47% 4,62% 4,67% 5,07% 9,42% 10,37%10,37%
kd 2,85% 2,85% 2,85% 2,85% 3,29% 3,40% 3,43% 3,73% 6,92% 7,62% 7,83%
re 3,82% 3,89% 3,98% 4,05% 4,09% 4,25% 4,46% 4,78% 9,42% 10,37%10,37%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 3,82% 3,79% 3,75% 3,73% 3,85% 3,91% 3,95% 4,15% 7,67% 8,17% 8,08%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 13,82% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508 14 508
Interest 0 63 87 151 231 350 1 292 1 550 1 808 2 067 2 325
Ebit 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A- BB+ CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 11,74 8,50 4,86 3,18 2,10 0,57 0,47 0,41 0,36 0,32
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82%
β0 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42
βl 0,42 0,45 0,47 0,50 0,55 0,62 0,73 0,88 1,14 1,65 3,19
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,22% 5,32% 6,04% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,83% 3,91% 4,44% 15,12% 15,57% 15,89% 16,13% 16,31%
re 4,57% 4,67% 4,71% 4,79% 4,94% 5,15% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 4,57% 4,52% 4,50% 4,60% 4,63% 4,86% 16,46% 16,46% 16,46% 16,46% 16,46%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 12,52% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546 14 546
Interest 0 52 65 125 207 645 806 967 1 128 1 289 1 451
Ebit 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549
Rating AAA AAA AAA A BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 10,64 8,50 4,39 2,65 0,85 0,68 0,57 0,49 0,43 0,38
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07%
β0 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45
βl 0,45 0,48 0,49 0,53 0,59 0,66 0,77 0,94 1,21 1,75 3,39
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,30% 4,75% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,61% 2,61% 2,61% 3,16% 3,49% 8,58% 9,08% 9,41% 9,65% 9,83% 9,97%
re 4,33% 4,44% 4,47% 4,58% 4,76% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 13,38%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 4,33% 4,26% 4,24% 4,30% 4,38% 10,08% 10,08% 10,08% 10,08% 10,08% 10,31%
2010
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Table C28 - Belgacom Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C29 - Belgacom Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C30 - Belgacom Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C31 - Belgacom Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 98,12%
D+E 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513 11 513
Interest 0 50 100 150 208 277 334 391 447 502 548
Ebit 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643 1 643
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A+ A A- A- A- A-
ICR ∞ 32,82 16,41 10,94 7,90 5,94 4,93 4,20 3,68 3,27 3,00
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89% 5,89%
β0 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71
βl 0,71 0,76 0,83 0,91 1,02 1,18 1,42 1,81 2,59 4,94 25,16
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,35% 4,35% 4,52% 4,81% 4,83% 4,85% 4,85% 4,85% 4,85%
kd 2,87% 2,87% 2,87% 2,87% 2,98% 3,17% 3,19% 3,20% 3,20% 3,20% 3,20%
re 7,87% 8,18% 8,56% 9,06% 9,71% 10,64% 12,02% 14,32% 18,93% 32,76% 151,82%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 7,87% 7,65% 7,42% 7,20% 7,02% 6,91% 6,72% 6,54% 6,35% 6,16% 6,00%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 99,99%
D+E 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785 9 785
Interest 0 50 99 149 198 254 312 366 420 473 526
Ebit 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727 1 727
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A+ A A- A- A-
ICR ∞ 34,80 17,40 11,60 8,70 6,80 5,53 4,72 4,11 3,65 3,29
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91%
β0 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69
βl 0,69 0,74 0,81 0,89 1,00 1,15 1,38 1,76 2,53 4,82 4580,58
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,19% 5,32% 5,34% 5,37% 5,37% 5,37%
kd 3,35% 3,35% 3,35% 3,35% 3,35% 3,43% 3,51% 3,53% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55%
re 8,11% 8,46% 8,90% 9,46% 10,22% 11,27% 12,86% 15,50% 20,78% 36,61% 31675,65%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 8,11% 7,95% 7,79% 7,63% 7,47% 7,35% 7,25% 7,12% 6,99% 6,85% 6,71%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 53,25% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132 13 132
Interest 0 73 147 238 337 422 449 522 957 1 467 1 650
Ebit 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347 1 347
Rating AAA AAA AAA A+ A- A- A- BBB B- CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 18,35 9,17 5,65 3,99 3,20 3,00 2,58 1,41 0,92 0,82
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96%
β0 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
βl 0,50 0,53 0,58 0,64 0,72 0,83 0,87 0,99 1,26 1,81 3,45
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 5,59% 6,05% 6,42% 6,42% 6,42% 6,63% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,69% 3,69% 3,69% 3,99% 4,24% 4,24% 4,24% 4,38% 6,87% 9,60% 10,09%
re 7,41% 7,66% 7,98% 8,39% 8,93% 9,70% 10,01% 10,84% 12,74% 16,55% 27,98%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 7,41% 7,27% 7,12% 7,07% 7,06% 6,97% 6,94% 6,96% 8,63% 10,99%11,88%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 55,85% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168 13 168
Interest 0 67 134 217 300 375 419 474 717 922 1 132
Ebit 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256 1 256
Rating AAA AAA AAA A+ A- A- A- BBB B+ B- CCC
ICR ∞ 18,73 9,36 5,79 4,19 3,35 3,00 2,65 1,75 1,36 1,11
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74%
β0 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54
βl 0,54 0,58 0,63 0,70 0,78 0,90 1,00 1,08 1,38 1,98 3,77
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,09% 5,49% 5,69% 5,69% 5,69% 5,99% 7,78% 8,75% 9,55%
kd 3,36% 3,36% 3,36% 3,63% 3,76% 3,76% 3,76% 3,96% 5,14% 5,78% 6,31%
re 7,43% 7,66% 7,94% 8,31% 8,80% 9,49% 10,04% 10,52% 12,24% 15,67% 25,98%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 7,43% 7,23% 7,03% 6,91% 6,79% 6,62% 6,53% 6,58% 7,27% 7,76% 8,27%
2007
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Table C32 - Belgacom Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C32 - Belgacom Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C33 - Belgacom Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C34 - Deutsche Telekom Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 79,34% 80% 90%
D+E 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276 11 276
Interest 0 44 87 131 190 261 316 369 418 457 956
Ebit 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254 1 254
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BBB B-
ICR ∞ 28,73 14,36 9,58 6,59 4,81 3,97 3,40 3,00 2,74 1,31
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34%
β0 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48
βl 0,48 0,52 0,56 0,62 0,69 0,80 0,96 1,22 1,70 1,75 3,34
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 4,67% 5,07% 9,42%
kd 2,56% 2,56% 2,56% 2,56% 2,79% 3,05% 3,08% 3,08% 3,08% 3,35% 6,22%
re 4,56% 4,68% 4,83% 5,01% 5,27% 5,62% 6,15% 7,04% 8,64% 8,81% 14,12%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 4,56% 4,47% 4,37% 4,28% 4,28% 4,34% 4,31% 4,27% 4,23% 4,44% 7,01%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 34,72% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384 10 384
Interest 0 45 90 134 156 213 271 331 386 475 1 664
Ebit 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323 1 323
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA A+ A A- A- BBB CCC
ICR ∞ 29,51 14,76 9,84 8,50 6,22 4,88 3,99 3,42 2,79 0,79
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
β0 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48
βl 0,48 0,51 0,56 0,61 0,64 0,69 0,79 0,95 1,21 1,74 3,31
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,12% 5,22% 5,32% 5,32% 5,72% 17,81%
kd 2,85% 2,85% 2,85% 2,85% 2,85% 3,38% 3,44% 3,51% 3,51% 3,77% 13,00%
re 5,14% 5,27% 5,43% 5,64% 5,76% 5,91% 6,30% 6,88% 7,84% 9,77% 15,56%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 5,14% 5,03% 4,91% 4,80% 4,75% 4,90% 4,87% 4,86% 4,81% 4,97% 13,25%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 99,99%
D+E 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266 10 266
Interest 0 36 73 109 146 182 246 309 353 407 452
Ebit 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610 1 610
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A A- A-
ICR ∞ 44,18 22,09 14,73 11,04 8,84 6,53 5,21 4,56 3,96 3,56
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93%
β0 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48
βl 0,48 0,52 0,56 0,62 0,69 0,80 0,96 1,22 1,75 3,34 3177,81
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,30% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40%
kd 2,34% 2,34% 2,34% 2,34% 2,34% 2,34% 2,64% 2,84% 2,84% 2,90% 2,90%
re 4,85% 4,99% 5,17% 5,39% 5,69% 6,10% 6,73% 7,77% 9,85% 16,09%12490,77%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 4,85% 4,73% 4,60% 4,48% 4,35% 4,22% 4,28% 4,32% 4,24% 4,22% 4,15%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 50,23% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968 120 968
Interest 0 526 1 093 1 752 2 346 2 932 2 946 7 017 8 822 10 082 11 342
Ebit 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838 8 838
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 16,80 8,09 5,04 3,77 3,01 3,00 1,26 1,00 0,88 0,78
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46% 6,46%
β0 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64
βl 0,64 0,69 0,74 0,81 0,91 1,04 1,04 1,24 1,56 2,22 4,19
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,52% 4,83% 4,85% 4,85% 4,85% 9,67% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
kd 2,66% 2,66% 2,76% 2,95% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 5,91% 6,37% 6,87% 7,26%
re 7,85% 8,13% 8,48% 8,94% 9,54% 10,39% 10,41% 11,66% 13,78% 18,02% 30,74%
Tc 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90%
WACC 7,85% 7,58% 7,34% 7,14% 6,91% 6,68% 6,67% 8,21% 8,59% 9,10% 9,61%
2004
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Table C35 - Deutsche Telekom Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C36 - Deutsche Telekom Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C37 - Deutsche Telekom Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C38 - Deutsche Telekom Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 60,92% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 105 830 105 830 105 830 105 830 105 830 105 830 105 830 105 83 105 830 105 830 105 830
Interest 0 537 1 073 1 689 2 261 2 842 3 411 3 463 6 253 7 231 8 135
Ebit 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390 10 390
Rating AAA AAA AAA A+ A A- A- A- B B- B-
ICR ∞ 19,36 9,68 6,15 4,60 3,66 3,05 3,00 1,66 1,44 1,28
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67% 7,67%
β0 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62
βl 0,62 0,66 0,71 0,78 0,87 0,99 1,18 1,21 1,50 2,13 4,01
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,32% 5,34% 5,37% 5,37% 5,37% 8,44% 8,54% 8,54%
kd 3,10% 3,10% 3,10% 3,25% 3,26% 3,28% 3,28% 3,28% 5,16% 5,22% 5,22%
re 8,05% 8,37% 8,77% 9,29% 9,98% 10,94% 12,39% 12,56% 14,80% 19,62% 34,09%
Tc 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90%
WACC 8,05% 7,84% 7,64% 7,48% 7,29% 7,11% 6,92% 6,91% 8,05% 8,10% 8,11%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 57,72% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058 107 058
Interest 0 598 1 197 1 998 2 749 3 549 4 097 4 888 7 801 11 956 13 451
Ebit 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245 10 245
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A- BBB BBB BB B- CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 17,12 8,56 5,13 3,73 2,89 2,50 2,10 1,31 0,86 0,76
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60%
β0 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62
βl 0,62 0,66 0,71 0,78 0,87 0,99 1,13 1,18 1,49 2,12 4,00
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 5,59% 6,22% 6,42% 6,63% 6,63% 7,61% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,42% 3,42% 3,42% 3,80% 3,92% 4,05% 4,05% 4,65% 6,36% 9,31% 9,82%
re 8,63% 8,95% 9,34% 9,86% 10,54% 11,49% 12,53% 12,92% 15,30% 2,07% 34,37%
Tc 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90%
WACC 8,63% 8,39% 8,16% 8,04% 7,89% 7,77% 7,64% 7,96% 9,04% 11,46%12,28%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 28,20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456 108 456
Interest 0 574 1 235 1 833 2 685 4 144 5 181 6 217 7 253 8 289 9 325
Ebit 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582 4 582
Rating AAA AA A- BBB B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 7,98 3,71 2,50 1,71 1,11 0,88 0,74 0,63 0,55 0,49
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78%
β0 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61
βl 0,61 0,65 0,70 0,76 0,77 0,86 0,98 1,17 1,48 2,10 3,97
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,29% 5,69% 5,99% 8,25% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,11% 3,23% 3,48% 3,66% 5,04% 5,84% 6,27% 6,81% 7,21% 7,50% 7,73%
re 9,06% 9,38% 9,78% 10,19% 10,30% 10,99% 11,96% 13,41% 15,83%20,66% 35,17%
Tc 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90% 38,90%
WACC 9,06% 8,76% 8,52% 8,35% 8,72% 8,93% 9,11% 9,45% 9,79% 10,13%0,47%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 45,13% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478 93 478
Interest 0 362 789 1 296 1 747 1 971 4 403 5 817 6 786 7 756 8 725
Ebit 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912 5 912
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 16,34 7,49 4,56 3,38 3,00 1,34 1,02 0,87 0,76 0,68
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16% 6,16%
β0 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49
βl 0,49 0,53 0,58 0,64 0,72 0,78 0,84 1,01 1,30 1,87 3,60
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 9,42% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,70% 2,70% 2,95% 3,23% 3,26% 3,26% 6,58% 7,24% 7,64% 7,99% 8,25%
re 5,99% 6,23% 6,52% 6,90% 7,41% 7,74% 8,12% 9,18% 10,95% 14,49% 25,10%
Tc 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18%
WACC 5,99% 5,88% 5,81% 5,80% 5,75% 5,72% 7,35% 8,02% 8,64% 9,29% 9,94%
2008
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values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 62,68% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268 92 268
Interest 0 328 655 1 107 1 587 2 030 2 436 2 545 3 733 8 179 9 201
Ebit 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635 7 635
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BB CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 23,31 11,65 6,90 4,81 3,76 3,13 3,00 2,05 0,93 0,83
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93% 6,93%
β0 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40
βl 0,40 0,43 0,47 0,52 0,59 0,68 0,82 0,87 1,06 1,52 2,93
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 4,40% 5,78% 11,08%11,08%
kd 2,48% 2,48% 2,48% 2,79% 3,00% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 4,04% 7,96% 8,31%
re 5,75% 5,97% 6,24% 6,58% 7,05% 7,70% 8,67% 9,02% 10,29% 13,53% 2 ,26%
Tc 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18%
WACC 5,75% 5,62% 5,48% 5,45% 5,43% 5,38% 5,31% 5,29% 5,91% 9,07% 9,80%
2010
Table C39- Deutsche Telekom Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 











Table C41 - Elisa OYJ Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C42 - Elisa OYJ Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 21,49% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 96 069 96 069 96 069 96 069 96 069 96 069 96 069 96 069 96 06 96 069 96 069
Interest 0 415 829 891 1 504 2 043 2 746 10 264 11 975 13 685 15 396
Ebit 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577 7 577
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA A A- BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 18,27 9,14 8,50 5,04 3,71 2,76 0,74 0,63 0,55 0,49
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28% 6,28%
β0 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42
βl 0,42 0,45 0,49 0,50 0,55 0,62 0,72 0,86 1,11 1,60 3,07
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,22% 5,32% 5,72% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,01% 3,01% 3,01% 3,01% 3,64% 3,71% 3,99% 13,84% 14,41% 14,83% 15,16%
re 6,03% 6,24% 6,50% 6,54% 6,83% 7,27% 7,88% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 22,67%
Tc 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18% 30,18%
WACC 6,03% 5,92% 5,80% 5,78% 5,87% 5,84% 5,94% 15,43% 15,43% 15,43% 15,91%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 67,96% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307 2 307
Interest 0 10 20 31 45 56 67 76 85 178 216
Ebit 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BBB B- CCC
ICR ∞ 22,73 11,37 7,29 5,12 4,08 3,40 3,00 2,69 1,28 1,05
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91% 9,91%
β0 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86 0,86
βl 0,86 0,92 1,01 1,12 1,26 1,46 1,77 2,15 2,27 3,29 6,33
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,35% 4,52% 4,83% 4,85% 4,85% 4,85% 5,26% 9,67% 10,42%
kd 3,09% 3,09% 3,09% 3,21% 3,43% 3,44% 3,44% 3,44% 3,73% 6,86% 7,40%
re 12,17% 12,84% 13,68% 14,76% 16,19% 18,20% 21,21% 24,95% 26,24% 36,28% 66,42%
Tc 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00%
WACC 12,17% 11,87% 11,56% 11,29% 11,09% 10,82% 10,55% 10,34% 10,48% 12,75% 13,30%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 25,70% 30% 40% 50% 60,00% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102 3 102
Interest 0 17 33 43 79 118 148 178 207 237 266
Ebit 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
Rating AAA A A- A- B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 7,76 3,86 3,00 1,64 1,09 0,87 0,72 0,62 0,54 0,48
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97% 10,97%
β0 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,94
βl 0,94 1,02 1,12 1,18 1,24 1,41 1,64 1,99 2,57 3,73 7,22
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,34% 5,37% 5,37% 8,44% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,75% 3,95% 3,97% 3,97% 6,25% 7,06% 7,39% 7,75% 8,00% 8,19% 8,34%
re 13,65% 14,50% 15,56% 16,29% 16,93% 18,75% 21,30% 25,12% 31,50% 44,25% 82,50%
Tc 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00%
WACC 13,65% 13,44% 13,24% 13,13% 13,72% 14,07% 14,34% 14,70% 15,05% 15,41% 15,76%
2005
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Table C43 - Elisa OYJ Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C44 - Elisa OYJ Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C45 - Elisa OYJ Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C46 - Elisa OYJ Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 35,63% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759 3 759
Interest 0 21 47 72 89 157 262 315 367 420 472
Ebit 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
Rating AAA AAA A A- BBB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 10,56 4,75 3,07 2,50 1,42 0,85 0,71 0,60 0,53 0,47
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03% 11,03%
β0 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96
βl 0,96 1,04 1,13 1,26 1,35 1,43 1,67 2,02 2,61 3,79 7,33
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 6,22% 6,42% 6,63% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 4,14% 4,14% 4,60% 4,75% 4,91% 7,70% 10,89% 11,40% 11,77% 12,04% 12,25%
re 14,51% 15,38% 16,46% 17,86% 18,83% 19,72% 22,32% 26,23% 32,74% 45,76% 84,83%
Tc 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00%
WACC 14,51% 14,25% 14,09% 13,92% 13,87% 14,91% 16,61% 17,33% 18,06% 18,79% 19,51%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 47,01% 50% 60,00% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079 4 079
Interest 0 21 43 70 93 115 159 214 273 312 351
Ebit 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287
Rating AAA AAA AA A- A- BBB B+ B- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 13,83 6,65 4,12 3,09 2,50 1,81 1,34 1,05 0,92 0,82
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18% 10,18%
β0 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84
βl 0,84 0,91 1,00 1,11 1,26 1,40 1,47 1,78 2,30 3,34 6,47
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,29% 5,69% 5,69% 5,99% 7,78% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,77% 3,77% 3,92% 4,21% 4,21% 4,43% 5,76% 6,48% 7,07% 7,26% 7,52%
re 12,90% 13,61% 14,49% 15,63% 17,14% 18,55% 19,26% 22,44% 27,74% 38,35% 70,15%
Tc 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00%
WACC 12,90% 12,63% 12,38% 12,20% 11,97% 11,91% 12,51% 12,86% 13,27% 13,48% 13,78%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 68,95% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759 2 759
Interest 0 11 21 35 51 64 77 89 98 208 258
Ebit 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BBB B- CCC
ICR ∞ 24,96 12,48 7,63 5,23 4,14 3,45 3,00 2,72 1,28 1,04
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85% 7,85%
β0 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66
βl 0,66 0,72 0,78 0,87 0,99 1,15 1,40 1,75 1,81 2,62 5,07
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 4,67% 5,07% 9,42% 10,37%
kd 2,86% 2,86% 2,86% 3,12% 3,42% 3,46% 3,46% 3,46% 3,75% 6,97% 7,67%
re 8,15% 8,58% 9,11% 9,80% 10,71% 11,99% 13,92% 16,69% 17,12% 23,53% 42,76%
Tc 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00%
WACC 8,15% 8,00% 7,86% 7,79% 7,80% 7,73% 7,64% 7,57% 7,76% 10,28%11,18%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 51,69% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233 3 233
Interest 0 14 28 51 69 86 89 117 403 461 518
Ebit 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A- A- A- BB+ CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 19,10 9,55 5,27 3,88 3,10 3,00 2,28 0,66 0,58 0,51
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14% 8,14%
β0 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66
βl 0,66 0,71 0,78 0,87 0,98 1,15 1,18 1,39 1,80 2,61 5,05
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,22% 5,32% 5,32% 5,32% 6,04% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,19% 3,19% 3,19% 3,86% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 4,47% 14,74% 15,13% 5,42%
re 8,75% 9,19% 9,74% 10,45% 11,39% 12,72% 12,99% 14,70% 18,00%24,62% 44,45%
Tc 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00%
WACC 8,75% 8,59% 8,43% 8,47% 8,41% 8,32% 8,31% 8,56% 15,72% 17,02% 18,33%
2009
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Table C47 - Elisa OYJ Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C48- Hellenic Telecom Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C49 - Hellenic Telecom Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C50 - Hellenic Telecom Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 60,74% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 343 3 43
Interest 0 12 24 40 57 74 88 89 259 296 333
Ebit 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 22,59 11,29 6,68 4,66 3,64 3,04 3,00 1,03 0,90 0,80
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12% 9,12%
β0 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62 0,62
βl 0,62 0,68 0,74 0,82 0,93 1,09 1,32 1,34 1,70 2,47 4,78
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 4,40% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,63% 2,63% 2,63% 2,96% 3,18% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 8,20% 8,47% 8,76%
re 8,65% 9,12% 9,71% 10,46% 11,46% 12,86% 14,97% 15,17% 18,48%25,50% 46,55%
Tc 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00%
WACC 8,65% 8,47% 8,29% 8,21% 8,15% 8,06% 7,94% 7,93% 11,28% 11,88% 12,54%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 46,13% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 666 9 66
Interest 0 42 87 140 187 216 254 604 705 806 906
Ebit 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649 649
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 15,43 7,43 4,63 3,46 3,00 2,55 1,07 0,92 0,81 0,72
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97% 5,97%
β0 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57
βl 0,57 0,61 0,66 0,72 0,81 0,88 0,93 1,12 1,42 2,04 3,87
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,52% 4,83% 4,85% 4,85% 5,26% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
kd 2,83% 2,83% 2,94% 3,14% 3,15% 3,15% 3,42% 6,77% 7,06% 7,48% 7,81%
re 7,06% 7,30% 7,60% 8,00% 8,52% 8,93% 9,25% 10,35% 12,17% 15,83% 26,79%
Tc 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00%
WACC 7,06% 6,85% 6,67% 6,54% 6,37% 6,27% 6,33% 8,20% 8,60% 9,15% 9,71%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 1,21% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270 12 270
Interest 0 8 117 234 351 468 585 702 820 937 1 054
Ebit 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Rating AAA A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 3,00 0,21 0,10 0,07 0,05 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53% 7,53%
β0 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59
βl 0,59 0,59 0,63 0,69 0,76 0,86 0,99 1,19 1,52 2,19 4,20
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,37% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,45% 3,65% 8,92% 9,23% 9,33% 9,38% 9,42% 9,44% 9,45% 9,46% 9,47%
re 7,75% 7,78% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,76% 10,77% 12,27% 14,79% 19,82% 34,91%
Tc 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00%
WACC 7,75% 7,73% 9,48% 9,48% 9,48% 9,61% 10,09% 10,57% 11,05% 11,53% 12,02%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 35,88% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746 15 746
Interest 0 88 191 303 363 418 820 1 319 1 539 1 759 1 978
Ebit 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088 1 088
Rating AAA AAA A+ A- A- BBB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,36 5,71 3,59 3,00 2,61 1,33 0,83 0,71 0,62 0,55
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39% 7,39%
β0 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55
βl 0,55 0,59 0,65 0,72 0,77 0,81 0,94 1,14 1,46 2,11 4,06
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 6,05% 6,42% 6,42% 6,63% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,97% 3,97% 4,30% 4,56% 4,56% 4,71% 7,39% 10,62% 11,10% 11,45% 11,73%
re 8,01% 8,33% 8,73% 9,25% 9,63% 9,94% 10,90% 12,34% 14,75% 19,56% 33,99%
Tc 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00%
WACC 8,01% 7,90% 7,85% 7,84% 7,81% 7,84% 9,14% 11,31% 12,19% 13,07% 13,96%
2006
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Table C51 - Hellenic Telecom Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C52 - Hellenic Telecom Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C53 - Hellenic Telecom Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C54 - Hellenic Telecom Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 37,30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880 17 880
Interest 0 91 196 305 380 429 738 1 025 1 196 1 366 1 537
Ebit 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139 1 139
Rating AAA AAA A+ A- A- BBB B CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,51 5,80 3,73 3,00 2,66 1,54 1,11 0,95 0,83 0,74
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38% 7,38%
β0 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47
βl 0,47 0,50 0,55 0,61 0,67 0,70 0,81 0,99 1,28 1,86 3,60
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,49% 5,69% 5,69% 5,99% 8,25% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,82% 3,82% 4,12% 4,27% 4,27% 4,49% 6,19% 7,16% 7,28% 7,56% 7,78%
re 7,74% 8,03% 8,38% 8,84% 9,27% 9,46% 10,32% 11,60% 13,75% 18,04% 30,92%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 7,74% 7,61% 7,53% 7,47% 7,41% 7,47% 8,25% 8,94% 9,22% 9,66% 10,10%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 29,94% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 11 881 11 881 11 881 11 881 11 881 11 881 11 881 11 881 11 88 11 881 11 881
Interest 0 46 92 138 150 212 275 333 388 895 1 109
Ebit 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170 1 170
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A+ A A- A- B- CCC
ICR ∞ 25,45 12,72 8,50 7,78 5,51 4,26 3,51 3,01 1,31 1,06
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41% 3,41%
β0 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44
βl 0,44 0,48 0,53 0,59 0,59 0,67 0,78 0,95 1,22 1,78 3,45
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,47% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 9,42% 10,37%
kd 2,90% 2,90% 2,90% 2,90% 3,17% 3,35% 3,47% 3,50% 3,50% 7,07% 7,78%
re 4,47% 4,59% 4,75% 4,95% 4,96% 5,23% 5,61% 6,17% 7,12% 9,02% 14,70%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 4,47% 4,42% 4,38% 4,34% 4,42% 4,48% 4,54% 4,57% 4,59% 7,46% 8,47%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 28,55% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466 10 466
Interest 0 45 90 129 154 218 278 334 419 1 491 1 677
Ebit 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- BBB CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 24,27 12,13 8,50 7,10 5,02 3,94 3,28 2,62 0,74 0,65
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49%
β0 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42 0,42
βl 0,42 0,46 0,50 0,55 0,56 0,63 0,74 0,90 1,16 1,69 3,27
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 4,92% 5,22% 5,32% 5,32% 5,72% 17,81%17,81%
kd 3,24% 3,24% 3,24% 3,24% 3,69% 3,91% 3,99% 3,99% 4,29% 14,53%14,90%
re 4,86% 4,99% 5,14% 5,31% 5,34% 5,60% 5,97% 6,52% 7,45% 17,81%17,81%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 4,86% 4,81% 4,76% 4,71% 4,84% 4,93% 4,98% 5,00% 5,24% 15,19%5,19%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 16,91% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304 8 304
Interest 0 29 50 71 110 158 460 552 644 736 828
Ebit 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424
Rating AAA AAA AAA A+ A- BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 14,37 8,50 6,00 3,87 2,69 0,92 0,77 0,66 0,58 0,51
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23%
β0 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
βl 0,33 0,35 0,38 0,39 0,43 0,49 0,58 0,70 0,91 1,32 2,56
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,25% 4,40% 4,75% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,70% 2,70% 2,70% 3,23% 3,34% 3,61% 8,63% 9,04% 9,33% 9,55% 9,72%
re 3,69% 3,75% 3,81% 3,83% 3,93% 4,06% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
Tc 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00%
WACC 3,69% 3,65% 3,62% 3,71% 3,75% 3,88% 9,86% 9,86% 9,86% 9,86% 9,86%
2010
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Table C55 - KPN Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C56 - KPN Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C57 - KPN Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C58 - KPN Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 70,62% 80% 90%
D+E 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196 25 196
Interest 0 110 219 342 487 608 733 855 863 1 949 2 362
Ebit 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588 2 588
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A A- A- A- B- CCC
ICR ∞ 23,62 11,81 7,58 5,32 4,25 3,53 3,03 3,00 1,33 1,10
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60% 7,60%
β0 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58
βl 0,58 0,63 0,68 0,75 0,84 0,97 1,16 1,48 1,51 2,12 4,03
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,35% 4,52% 4,83% 4,83% 4,85% 4,85% 4,85% 9,67% 10,42%
kd 2,85% 2,85% 2,85% 2,96% 3,16% 3,16% 3,18% 3,18% 3,18% 6,33% 6,82%
re 8,13% 8,45% 8,86% 9,37% 10,07% 11,04% 12,49% 14,92% 15,13% 19,77% 34,33%
Tc 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50%
WACC 8,13% 7,89% 7,65% 7,45% 7,31% 7,10% 6,90% 6,70% 6,69% 9,02% 9,57%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 52,75% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480 27 480
Interest 0 139 285 440 590 738 779 1 161 1 643 2 098 2 360
Ebit 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336 2 336
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BB B- CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 16,76 8,19 5,31 3,96 3,17 3,00 2,01 1,42 1,11 0,99
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67% 8,67%
β0 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59
βl 0,59 0,64 0,69 0,77 0,86 1,00 1,05 1,20 1,54 2,22 4,24
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,19% 5,34% 5,37% 5,37% 5,37% 7,04% 8,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,47% 3,47% 3,56% 3,66% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 4,82% 5,85% 6,54% 6,57%
re 8,45% 8,84% 9,33% 9,95% 10,79% 11,97% 12,38% 13,73% 16,66% 22,52% 40,12%
Tc 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50% 31,50%
WACC 8,45% 8,30% 8,17% 8,07% 7,95% 7,82% 7,79% 8,38% 9,09% 9,73% 9,92%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 42,66% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 29 652 29 652 29 652 29 652 29 652 29 652 29 652 29 652 29 65 29 652 29 652
Interest 0 166 340 553 761 812 1 062 1 852 2 898 3 312 3 726
Ebit 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437 2 437
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- BB+ B- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 14,70 7,16 4,40 3,20 3,00 2,30 1,32 0,84 0,74 0,65
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10% 8,10%
β0 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61
βl 0,61 0,65 0,71 0,79 0,89 0,92 1,03 1,25 1,60 2,31 4,44
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 5,74% 6,22% 6,42% 6,42% 7,16% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,94% 3,94% 4,04% 4,38% 4,52% 4,52% 5,04% 7,33% 10,48% 10,92% 11,26%
re 8,86% 9,24% 9,72% 10,34% 11,16% 11,43% 12,31% 14,04% 16,92%2 ,68% 39,96%
Tc 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60% 29,60%
WACC 8,86% 8,71% 8,58% 8,55% 8,50% 8,48% 8,68% 10,01% 12,42% 13,27% 14,13%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 43,01% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025 34 025
Interest 0 173 360 576 775 833 1 324 1 787 2 275 2 600 2 925
Ebit 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500 2 500
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- B+ B- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 14,43 6,94 4,34 3,23 3,00 1,89 1,40 1,10 0,96 0,85
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37% 7,37%
β0 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52
βl 0,52 0,56 0,62 0,69 0,78 0,81 0,91 1,10 1,43 2,07 4,02
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,29% 5,64% 5,69% 5,69% 7,78% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,79% 3,79% 3,94% 4,20% 4,24% 4,24% 5,80% 6,52% 7,12% 7,21% 7,47%
re 8,15% 8,46% 8,86% 9,37% 10,05% 10,30% 11,01% 12,44% 14,82% 19,59% 33,89%
Tc 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50%
WACC 8,15% 8,00% 7,88% 7,82% 7,73% 7,70% 8,40% 8,89% 9,43% 9,69% 10,11%
2007
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Table C59 - KPN Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C60 - KPN Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C61 - KPN Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C62 - Orange Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 26,45% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836 29 836
Interest 0 116 231 306 378 552 697 836 1 968 2 475 2 785
Ebit 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597 2 597
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- B- CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 22,48 11,24 8,50 6,87 4,71 3,73 3,11 1,32 1,05 0,93
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24% 5,24%
β0 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
βl 0,50 0,54 0,59 0,63 0,65 0,74 0,87 1,05 1,36 1,98 3,82
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 9,42% 10,37%10,37%
kd 2,88% 2,88% 2,88% 2,88% 3,14% 3,44% 3,48% 3,48% 7,02% 7,73% 7,91%
re 5,55% 5,77% 6,04% 6,25% 6,38% 6,84% 7,49% 8,46% 10,07% 13,30% 22,99%
Tc 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50%
WACC 5,55% 5,48% 5,41% 5,36% 5,41% 5,48% 5,49% 5,47% 7,94% 8,84% 9,41%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 23,78% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657 32 657
Interest 0 141 282 335 501 695 868 1 120 4 071 4 652 5 234
Ebit 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA A+ A- A- BBB CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 20,22 10,11 8,50 5,69 4,10 3,28 2,54 0,70 0,61 0,54
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55% 5,55%
β0 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45
βl 0,45 0,48 0,53 0,55 0,59 0,67 0,78 0,94 1,22 1,77 3,43
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,12% 5,32% 5,32% 5,72% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,22% 3,22% 3,22% 3,22% 3,81% 3,96% 3,96% 4,26% 14,63% 15,03% 15,33%
re 5,86% 6,06% 6,32% 6,43% 6,65% 7,09% 7,70% 8,62% 17,81% 17,81% 22,43%
Tc 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50%
WACC 5,86% 5,78% 5,70% 5,67% 5,80% 5,84% 5,83% 6,00% 15,58% 15,58% 16,04%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 36,25% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710 29 710
Interest 0 105 211 316 382 475 639 784 915 1 046 1 270
Ebit 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250 3 250
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BBB
ICR ∞ 30,81 15,41 10,27 8,50 6,84 5,09 4,14 3,55 3,11 2,56
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81% 5,81%
β0 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43
βl 0,43 0,46 0,50 0,56 0,61 0,64 0,74 0,90 1,16 1,69 3,28
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 4,40% 4,75%
kd 2,64% 2,64% 2,64% 2,64% 2,64% 2,98% 3,20% 3,28% 3,28% 3,28% 3,54%
re 5,43% 5,64% 5,90% 6,22% 6,48% 6,66% 7,28% 8,20% 9,73% 12,80%22,01%
Tc 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50%
WACC 5,43% 5,34% 5,25% 5,15% 5,09% 5,19% 5,24% 5,25% 5,21% 5,18% 5,39%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 55,06% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549 115 549
Interest 0 502 1 005 1 674 2 241 2 801 3 085 3 645 8 427 9 631 10 834
Ebit 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254 9 254
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A- A- A- BBB CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 18,42 9,21 5,53 4,13 3,30 3,00 2,54 1,10 0,96 0,85
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82% 4,82%
β0 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69
βl 0,69 0,74 0,80 0,88 0,99 1,14 1,24 1,36 1,73 2,48 4,71
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,35% 4,83% 4,85% 4,85% 4,85% 5,26% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
kd 2,81% 2,81% 2,81% 3,12% 3,13% 3,13% 3,13% 3,40% 6,73% 6,87% 7,27%
re 7,02% 7,26% 7,55% 7,94% 8,45% 9,17% 9,65% 10,24% 12,04% 15,62% 26,38%
Tc 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43%
WACC 7,02% 6,81% 6,60% 6,49% 6,32% 6,15% 6,06% 6,13% 8,32% 8,62% 9,18%
2004
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Table C63 - Orange Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C64 - Orange Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C65 - Orange Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C66 - Orange Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 62,26% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863 107 863
Interest 0 547 1 094 1 728 2 304 2 897 3 476 3 607 5 316 7 370 8 291
Ebit 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822 10 822
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A A- A- A- BB B- B-
ICR ∞ 19,78 9,89 6,26 4,70 3,74 3,11 3,00 2,04 1,47 1,31
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01% 6,01%
β0 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66
βl 0,66 0,71 0,77 0,84 0,95 1,09 1,31 1,37 1,66 2,38 4,53
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,34% 5,34% 5,37% 5,37% 5,37% 7,04% 8,54% 8,54%
kd 3,30% 3,30% 3,30% 3,47% 3,47% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 4,58% 5,56% 5,56%
re 7,28% 7,57% 7,93% 8,39% 9,00% 9,86% 11,15% 11,54% 13,31% 17,61% 30,53%
Tc 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95% 34,95%
WACC 7,28% 7,14% 7,00% 6,91% 6,79% 6,68% 6,56% 6,53% 7,20% 7,97% 8,05%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 67,34% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496 93 496
Interest 0 523 1 045 1 745 2 326 3 001 3 719 4 174 4 981 7 786 11 747
Ebit 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436 10 436
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A A- BBB BBB BB B- CCC
ICR ∞ 19,97 9,98 5,98 4,49 3,48 2,81 2,50 2,10 1,34 0,89
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84% 5,84%
β0 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,72
βl 0,72 0,78 0,84 0,93 1,04 1,20 1,44 1,70 1,83 2,62 4,99
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 5,59% 6,22% 6,22% 6,42% 6,63% 6,63% 7,61% 10,41%13,96%
kd 3,67% 3,67% 3,67% 4,08% 4,08% 4,21% 4,35% 4,35% 4,99% 6,83% 9,69%
re 8,17% 8,48% 8,86% 9,36% 10,02% 10,94% 12,32% 13,88% 14,63% 19,25% 33,09%
Tc 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43%
WACC 8,17% 8,00% 7,82% 7,77% 7,64% 7,57% 7,54% 7,46% 7,88% 9,31% 12,03%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 61,66% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 105 745 105 745 105 745 105 745 105 745 105 745 105 745 10 745 105 745 105 745 105 745
Interest 0 539 1 077 1 679 2 387 3 010 3 612 3 712 4 436 6 982 8 330
Ebit 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136 11 136
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BBB B B-
ICR ∞ 20,68 10,34 6,63 4,67 3,70 3,08 3,00 2,51 1,59 1,34
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10% 5,10%
β0 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53
βl 0,53 0,57 0,62 0,68 0,77 0,88 1,06 1,10 1,35 1,93 3,68
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,09% 5,29% 5,64% 5,69% 5,69% 5,69% 5,99% 8,25% 8,75%
kd 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,47% 3,70% 3,73% 3,73% 3,73% 3,93% 5,41% 5,74%
re 7,03% 7,23% 7,48% 7,79% 8,22% 8,81% 9,71% 9,90% 11,20% 14,17% 23,10%
Tc 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43%
WACC 7,03% 6,84% 6,65% 6,50% 6,41% 6,27% 6,12% 6,10% 6,11% 7,16% 7,48%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 82,66% 90%
D+E 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471 91 471
Interest 0 354 708 1 062 1 544 2 114 2 564 2 991 3 418 3 532 4 175
Ebit 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596 10 596
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- A- BBB
ICR ∞ 29,92 14,96 9,97 6,86 5,01 4,13 3,54 3,10 3,00 2,54
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62% 3,62%
β0 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52
βl 0,52 0,56 0,60 0,67 0,75 0,86 1,03 1,31 1,88 2,14 3,58
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 4,67% 4,67% 5,07%
kd 2,54% 2,54% 2,54% 2,54% 2,77% 3,03% 3,06% 3,06% 3,06% 3,06% 3,33%
re 4,83% 4,97% 5,14% 5,36% 5,66% 6,07% 6,69% 7,71% 9,77% 10,72%15,94%
Tc 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43%
WACC 4,83% 4,73% 4,62% 4,52% 4,50% 4,55% 4,51% 4,46% 4,40% 4,39% 4,59%
2008
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Table C67 - Orange Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C68 - Orange Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C69 - Telefonica Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C70 - Telefonica Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 62,39% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863 82.863
Interest 0 358 715 1.222 1.729 2.203 2.643 2.749 3.502 11.804 13.280
Ebit 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246 8.246
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BB+ CCC CCC
ICR ? 23,05 11,53 6,75 4,77 3,74 3,12 3,00 2,35 0,70 0,62
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77% 3,77%
β0 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46
βl 0,46 0,50 0,54 0,59 0,67 0,77 0,92 0,97 1,17 1,68 3,20
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 4,92% 5,22% 5,32% 5,32% 5,32% 6,04% 17,81%17,81%
kd 2,83% 2,83% 2,83% 3,22% 3,42% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 3,96% 13,52%14,00%
re 5,13% 5,26% 5,42% 5,63% 5,90% 6,28% 6,85% 7,03% 7,81% 17,81%17,81%
Tc 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43%
WACC 5,13% 5,02% 4,90% 4,90% 4,91% 4,88% 4,83% 4,82% 5,11% 14,38%14,38%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 86,34% 90%
D+E 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451 77 451
Interest 0 275 550 825 1 239 1 665 1 998 2 385 2 726 2 942 3 311
Ebit 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830 8 830
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A A- A- A- BBB
ICR ∞ 32,11 16,06 10,70 7,13 5,30 4,42 3,70 3,24 3,00 2,67
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84% 3,84%
β0 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45
βl 0,45 0,49 0,53 0,58 0,65 0,75 0,90 1,15 1,64 2,33 3,13
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,30% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 4,40% 4,75%
kd 2,33% 2,33% 2,33% 2,33% 2,62% 2,82% 2,82% 2,89% 2,89% 2,89% 3,11%
re 4,70% 4,83% 4,99% 5,19% 5,46% 5,84% 6,41% 7,36% 9,26% 11,90%14,96%
Tc 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43%
WACC 4,70% 4,58% 4,45% 4,33% 4,33% 4,33% 4,26% 4,23% 4,16% 4,12% 4,30%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 25,71% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908 12.908
Interest 0 56 125 161 374 538 672 807 941 1.076 1.210
Ebit 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483
Rating AAA AAA A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ? 8,60 3,86 3,00 1,29 0,90 0,72 0,60 0,51 0,45 0,40
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26%
β0 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28
βl 0,28 0,30 0,32 0,34 0,35 0,40 0,46 0,55 0,70 1,00 1,91
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,85% 4,85% 9,67% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
kd 2,87% 2,87% 3,20% 3,20% 6,38% 7,24% 7,87% 8,30% 8,60% 8,83% 9,01%
re 4,58% 4,65% 4,73% 4,78% 9,67% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
Tc 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00%
WACC 4,58% 4,47% 4,42% 4,38% 8,68% 9,15% 9,15% 9,15% 9,15% 9,15% 9,15%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 41,08% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 129 312 129 312 129 312 129 312 129 312 129 312 129 312 129 3 129 312 129 312 129 312
Interest 0 656 1 376 2 084 2 778 2 853 5 458 6 627 8 636 9 870 11 104
Ebit 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559 8 559
Rating AAA AAA A+ A- A- A- B B- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 13,05 6,22 4,11 3,08 3,00 1,57 1,29 0,99 0,87 0,77
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28% 9,28%
β0 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77 0,77
βl 0,77 0,82 0,89 0,98 1,10 1,11 1,26 1,51 1,93 2,76 5,24
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,32% 5,37% 5,37% 5,37% 8,44% 8,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,30% 3,30% 3,46% 3,49% 3,49% 3,49% 5,49% 5,55% 6,23% 6,65% 6,97%
re 10,41% 10,92% 11,56% 12,39% 13,48% 13,63% 15,02% 17,33% 21,18% 28,87% 51,94%
Tc 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00%
WACC 10,41% 10,16% 9,94% 9,72% 9,49% 9,46% 10,25% 10,26% 10,72% 11,09% 11,46%
2005
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Table C71 - Telefonica Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C72 - Telefonica Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C73 - Telefonica Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C74 - Telefonica Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 41,44% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166 137 166
Interest 0 767 1 660 2 642 3 638 3 769 7 140 11 489 13 404 15 319 17 234
Ebit 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422 9 422
Rating AAA AAA A+ A- BBB BBB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,29 5,68 3,57 2,59 2,50 1,32 0,82 0,70 0,62 0,55
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58% 9,58%
β0 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63
βl 0,63 0,67 0,73 0,80 0,90 0,91 1,03 1,24 1,57 2,25 4,28
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 6,05% 6,42% 6,63% 6,63% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,63% 3,63% 3,93% 4,17% 4,31% 4,31% 6,77% 9,95% 10,53% 10,95% 11,29%
re 9,94% 10,37% 10,91% 11,61% 12,54% 12,70% 13,83% 15,78% 19,03% 25,52% 44,99%
Tc 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00%
WACC 9,94% 9,70% 9,52% 9,38% 9,25% 9,22% 10,30% 12,28% 13,08% 13,87% 14,66%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 56,35% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563 158 563
Interest 0 808 1 679 2 684 3 611 4 751 5 355 7 405 9 716 12 118 13 633
Ebit 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388 13 388
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- BBB BBB B+ B- CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 16,58 7,98 4,99 3,71 2,82 2,50 1,81 1,38 1,10 0,98
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94% 8,94%
β0 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67
βl 0,67 0,73 0,79 0,87 0,98 1,13 1,26 1,36 1,74 2,50 4,77
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,29% 5,64% 5,69% 5,99% 5,99% 7,78% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,44% 3,44% 3,57% 3,81% 3,84% 4,05% 4,05% 5,25% 5,91% 6,45% 6,50%
re 10,34% 10,79% 11,35% 12,08% 13,05% 14,41% 15,59% 16,44% 19,83% 26,62% 46,97%
Tc 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50%
WACC 10,34% 10,05% 9,80% 9,60% 9,37% 9,23% 9,08% 9,73% 10,09% 10,48% 10,55%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 78,71% 80% 90%
D+E 125 772 125 772 125 772 125 772 125 772 125 772 125 772 125 77 125 772 125 772 125 772
Interest 0 487 974 1 461 2 124 2 906 3 525 4 113 4 624 5 103 10 664
Ebit 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873 13 873
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A A- A- A- BBB B-
ICR ∞ 28,49 14,25 9,50 6,53 4,77 3,94 3,37 3,00 2,72 1,30
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41% 7,41%
β0 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57
βl 0,57 0,62 0,67 0,74 0,84 0,97 1,17 1,51 2,05 2,17 4,18
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 4,67% 5,07% 9,42%
kd 2,71% 2,71% 2,71% 2,71% 2,95% 3,23% 3,27% 3,27% 3,27% 3,55% 6,59%
re 7,19% 7,52% 7,94% 8,47% 9,17% 10,16% 11,65% 14,12% 18,17% 19,07% 33,92%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 7,19% 7,04% 6,89% 6,74% 6,69% 6,70% 6,62% 6,53% 6,44% 6,65% 9,33%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 58,70% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 145 757 145 757 145 757 145 757 145 757 145 757 145 757 14 757 145 757 145 757 145 757
Interest 0 629 1 258 2 237 3 042 3 875 4 549 5 000 18 168 20 764 23 359
Ebit 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647 13 647
Rating AAA AAA AAA A+ A A- A- BBB CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 21,69 10,84 6,10 4,49 3,52 3,00 2,73 0,75 0,66 0,58
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78% 7,78%
β0 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55 0,55
βl 0,55 0,59 0,65 0,71 0,81 0,93 1,10 1,13 1,45 2,09 4,01
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,12% 5,22% 5,32% 5,32% 5,72% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,02% 3,02% 3,02% 3,58% 3,65% 3,72% 3,72% 4,00% 13,79% 14,30% 14,69%
re 7,66% 7,99% 8,41% 8,94% 9,65% 10,65% 11,91% 12,15% 14,64% 19,63% 34,58%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 7,66% 7,50% 7,33% 7,33% 7,25% 7,19% 7,10% 7,26% 14,05% 15,36% 16,68%
2009
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Table C75 - Telefonica Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C76 - Telekom Austria Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C77 - Telekom Austria Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C78 - Telekom Austria Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 90,71%
D+E 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592 137 592
Interest 0 488 977 1 465 2 201 2 924 3 550 4 238 4 843 5 449 5 491
Ebit 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474 16 474
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA AA A+ A A- A- A- A-
ICR ∞ 33,73 16,86 11,24 7,48 5,63 4,64 3,89 3,40 3,02 3,00
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10% 7,10%
β0 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52
βl 0,52 0,56 0,61 0,68 0,76 0,89 1,07 1,37 1,98 3,80 4,08
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,25% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 4,40% 4,40%
kd 2,49% 2,49% 2,49% 2,49% 2,80% 2,98% 3,01% 3,08% 3,08% 3,08% 3,08%
re 6,66% 6,95% 7,31% 7,77% 8,39% 9,25% 10,55% 12,71% 17,02% 29,97% 31,94%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 6,66% 6,50% 6,35% 6,19% 6,15% 6,11% 6,02% 5,97% 5,87% 5,77% 5,76%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 25,71% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908 12 908
Interest 0 56 125 161 374 538 672 807 941 1 076 1 210
Ebit 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483
Rating AAA AAA A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 8,60 3,86 3,00 1,29 0,90 0,72 0,60 0,51 0,45 0,40
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26% 3,26%
β0 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28
βl 0,28 0,30 0,32 0,34 0,35 0,40 0,46 0,55 0,70 1,00 1,91
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,85% 4,85% 9,67% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
kd 2,87% 2,87% 3,20% 3,20% 6,38% 7,24% 7,87% 8,30% 8,60% 8,83% 9,01%
re 4,58% 4,65% 4,73% 4,78% 9,67% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 9,91%
Tc 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00%
WACC 4,58% 4,47% 4,42% 4,38% 8,68% 9,15% 9,15% 9,15% 9,15% 9,15% 9,10%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 15 697 15 697 15 697 15 697 15 697 15 697 15 697 15 697 15 697 15 697
Interest 0 80 169 393 599 749 899 1 048 1 198 1 348
Ebit 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662
Rating AAA AAA A- B+ CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 8,31 3,92 1,68 1,10 0,88 0,74 0,63 0,55 0,49
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 5,96% 5,96% 5,96% 5,96% 5,96% 5,96% 5,96% 5,96% 5,96% 5,96%
β0 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31
βl 0,31 0,34 0,37 0,41 0,47 0,55 0,66 0,86 1,25 2,43
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,37% 8,34% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,80% 3,80% 4,03% 6,26% 7,16% 7,43% 7,78% 8,04% 8,22% 8,37%
re 5,17% 5,33% 5,52% 8,34% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 8,44% 10,77% 17,76%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 5,17% 5,18% 5,22% 7,72% 8,59% 8,49% 8,49% 8,16% 8,73% 9,31%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 12,94% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742 12 742
Interest 0 71 92 159 245 388 889 1 067 1 245 1 423 1 601
Ebit 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A- BB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 11,00 8,50 4,94 3,19 2,02 0,88 0,73 0,63 0,55 0,49
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07% 6,07%
β0 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
βl 0,33 0,36 0,37 0,39 0,44 0,50 0,58 0,70 0,91 1,33 2,57
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 5,59% 6,22% 6,42% 7,61% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 4,19% 4,19% 4,19% 4,67% 4,82% 5,71% 10,89% 11,40% 11,76% 12,04% 12,25%
re 5,96% 6,13% 6,18% 6,33% 6,60% 6,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 19,53%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 5,96% 5,93% 5,92% 6,00% 6,07% 6,46% 12,42% 12,42% 12,42% 12,42% 12,98%
2006
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Table C79 - Telekom Austria Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C80 - Telekom Austria Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C81 - Telekom Austria Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
 
Table C82 - Telekom Austria Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 42,74% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495 12 495
Interest 0 64 132 212 285 304 486 656 836 955 1 074
Ebit 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- B+ B- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 14,34 6,90 4,31 3,21 3,00 1,88 1,39 1,09 0,96 0,85
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28% 5,28%
β0 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40
βl 0,40 0,43 0,47 0,53 0,60 0,62 0,70 0,85 1,10 1,59 3,09
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,29% 5,64% 5,69% 5,69% 7,78% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,82% 3,82% 3,97% 4,23% 4,27% 4,27% 5,84% 6,56% 7,16% 7,27% 7,53%
re 6,41% 6,59% 6,81% 7,09% 7,46% 7,59% 7,99% 8,78% 10,09% 12,72% 20,61%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 6,41% 6,31% 6,24% 6,23% 6,19% 6,17% 6,91% 7,45% 8,04% 8,36% 8,83%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 5,04% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465 8 465
Interest 0 17 40 176 263 351 439 527 615 702 790
Ebit 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Rating AAA AAA A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 8,50 3,55 0,80 0,53 0,40 0,32 0,27 0,23 0,20 0,18
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55% 1,55%
β0 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53 0,53
βl 0,53 0,55 0,57 0,63 0,70 0,79 0,92 1,12 1,45 2,11 4,09
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 4,67% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,90% 2,90% 3,50% 8,30% 8,99% 9,34% 9,54% 9,68% 9,78% 9,85% 9,91%
re 3,77% 3,80% 3,84% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%10,37% 10,37%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 3,77% 3,76% 3,81% 9,96% 9,96% 9,96% 9,96% 9,96% 9,96% 9,96% 9,96%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 11,04% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 494 8 94
Interest 0 37 40 90 454 605 756 908 1 059 1 210 1 361
Ebit 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344
Rating AAA AAA AAA A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 9,38 8,50 3,81 0,76 0,57 0,45 0,38 0,32 0,28 0,25
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57%
β0 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52
βl 0,52 0,56 0,57 0,62 0,69 0,78 0,91 1,10 1,43 2,08 4,02
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,32% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,24% 3,24% 3,24% 3,99% 14,43% 15,28% 15,78% 16,12% 16,36% 16,54% 16,68%
re 4,72% 4,83% 4,85% 4,97% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 4,72% 4,67% 4,67% 4,77% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 23,30% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254 8 254
Interest 0 29 59 68 105 145 182 286 640 732 823
Ebit 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA A+ A- A- BB CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 19,81 9,90 8,50 5,51 4,00 3,20 2,03 0,91 0,79 0,71
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57% 2,57%
β0 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54 0,54
βl 0,54 0,58 0,64 0,66 0,71 0,80 0,94 1,14 1,47 2,14 4,15
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,25% 4,40% 4,40% 5,78% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,66% 2,66% 2,66% 2,66% 3,19% 3,30% 3,30% 4,34% 8,57% 8,88% 9,13%
re 4,34% 4,45% 4,60% 4,65% 4,78% 5,03% 5,37% 5,89% 11,08% 11,08% 13,63%
Tc 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 4,34% 4,28% 4,21% 4,19% 4,30% 4,34% 4,34% 4,96% 9,32% 9,32% 9,58%
2010
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PTM and Industry Peers – Optimal Debt Level 
Table C83 – PTM and Industry Peers – Optimal Debt Level 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BSKY 41,86% 45,19% 39,03% 33,64% 45,80% 16,95% 52,86% 
Cyfrowdy - - - - 21,17% 13,66% 17,96% 
Liberty Global - 8,54% 10,01% 22,15% 43,06% 21,00% 34,33% 
Sonaecom 8,83% 4,50% 1,15% 11,38% 5,88% 0,00% 0,00% 
Telenet - 26,96% 23,95% 28,64% 44,46% 40,96% 42,14% 
Virgin Media 5,10% 0,00% 0,20% 1,35% 13,32% 3,80% 20,93% 
Average 18,60% 17,04% 14,87% 19,43% 28,95% 16,06% 28,04% 
PTM 32,71% 32,21% 7,13% 13,38% 10,99% 7,13% 10,34% 
 
 
Table C84 – PTM – Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C85 – PTM – Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C86 – PTM – Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 32,71% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119 3 119
Interest 0 13 28 47 51 127 158 190 222 253 285
Ebit 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Rating AAA AAA A BBB BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 10,00 4,47 2,73 2,50 1,01 0,80 0,67 0,57 0,50 0,45
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36%
β0 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70
βl 0,70 0,76 0,83 0,92 0,95 1,04 1,21 1,46 1,88 2,73 5,26
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,08% 4,08% 4,56% 4,99% 4,99% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15%
kd 2,96% 2,96% 3,31% 3,62% 3,62% 7,36% 7,91% 8,28% 8,55% 8,75% 8,91%
re 4,63% 4,71% 4,81% 4,93% 4,97% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,84%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 4,63% 4,54% 4,51% 4,54% 4,53% 9,04% 9,03% 9,03% 9,03% 9,03% 9,10%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 32,21% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156 3 156
Interest 0 13 27 41 44 95 135 162 189 216 243
Ebit 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133
Rating AAA AAA A A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 10,38 4,87 3,22 3,00 1,40 0,99 0,82 0,71 0,62 0,55
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37%
β0 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71
βl 0,71 0,77 0,84 0,94 0,96 1,06 1,23 1,49 1,92 2,78 5,37
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,07% 4,07% 4,34% 4,37% 4,37% 7,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54%
kd 2,95% 2,95% 3,15% 3,17% 3,17% 5,47% 6,22% 6,61% 6,88% 7,09% 7,25%
re 5,00% 5,14% 5,31% 5,53% 5,58% 5,82% 6,23% 6,84% 7,87% 9,91% 16,05%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 5,00% 4,92% 4,88% 4,82% 4,81% 5,68% 6,22% 6,70% 7,18% 7,65% 8,13%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 7,13% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273 3 273
Interest 0 13 20 43 137 183 228 274 320 366 411
Ebit 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111
Rating AAA AAA A+ BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 8,50 5,60 2,56 0,81 0,61 0,49 0,40 0,35 0,30 0,27
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93%
β0 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67
βl 0,67 0,71 0,72 0,79 0,88 0,99 1,15 1,39 1,80 2,61 5,03
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 6,05% 6,63% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 4,05% 4,05% 4,39% 4,81% 10,85% 11,63% 12,10% 12,41% 12,63% 12,79% 12,92%
re 5,90% 6,01% 6,06% 6,26% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 18,67%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 5,90% 5,87% 5,89% 5,97% 13,03% 13,03% 13,03% 13,03% 13,03% 13,03% 13,50%
2006
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Table C87 – PTM – Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C88 – PTM – Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C89 – PTM – Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C90 – PTM – Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 13,38% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215 3 215
Interest 0 18 24 56 92 123 154 184 215 246 276
Ebit 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Rating AAA A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 4,02 3,00 1,31 0,80 0,60 0,48 0,40 0,34 0,30 0,27
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32%
β0 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,58
βl 0,58 0,63 0,65 0,69 0,77 0,87 1,01 1,23 1,58 2,30 4,44
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,69% 5,69% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,74% 4,18% 4,18% 6,43% 7,53% 8,04% 8,34% 8,54% 8,69% 8,80% 8,88%
re 6,24% 6,40% 6,46% 6,60% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,56% 11,93%19,04%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 6,24% 6,18% 6,16% 6,56% 8,95% 8,95% 8,95% 8,95% 8,95% 9,42% 9,90%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 10,99% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918 1 918
Interest 0 7 8 18 51 80 99 119 139 159 179
Ebit 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Rating AAA AAA AAA A- B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 13,73 12,50 5,69 2,01 1,28 1,03 0,85 0,73 0,64 0,57
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13%
β0 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51
βl 0,51 0,55 0,56 0,60 0,67 0,76 0,88 1,07 1,38 2,01 3,88
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,67% 8,82% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,85% 2,85% 2,85% 3,43% 6,48% 7,62% 7,62% 8,02% 8,36% 8,61% 8,81%
re 4,04% 4,12% 4,13% 4,23% 8,82% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 11,21%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 4,04% 4,00% 3,99% 4,07% 8,12% 9,27% 9,00% 8,96% 8,96% 8,96% 9,05%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 7,13% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249 2 249
Interest 0 7 12 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360
Ebit 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Rating AAA AAA AA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,50 7,46 1,08 0,72 0,54 0,43 0,36 0,31 0,27 0,24
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82%
β0 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49 0,49
βl 0,49 0,52 0,53 0,58 0,64 0,73 0,85 1,03 1,33 1,93 3,73
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,92% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,17% 3,17% 3,61% 13,09% 14,41% 15,26% 15,77% 16,11% 16,35%16,53% 16,67%
re 4,77% 4,85% 4,89% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%17,81% 17,81%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 4,77% 4,73% 4,75% 16,86% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79% 16,79%16,79% 16,79%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 10,34% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113 2 113
Interest 0 8 9 20 70 94 117 141 164 187 211
Ebit 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
Rating AAA AA AA BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 9,83 9,50 4,14 1,18 0,89 0,71 0,59 0,51 0,44 0,39
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07%
β0 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44
βl 0,44 0,47 0,47 0,52 0,58 0,65 0,76 0,92 1,19 1,73 3,33
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 4,00% 4,00% 4,75% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,61% 2,94% 2,94% 3,49% 8,14% 8,48% 9,00% 9,34% 9,59% 9,78% 9,92%
re 4,31% 4,42% 4,42% 4,56% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 13,21%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 4,31% 4,27% 4,27% 4,34% 10,20% 10,04% 10,04% 10,04% 10,04% 10,04% 10,25%
2010
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Table C91 – BSKY – Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C92 – BSKY – Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C93 – BSKY – Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C94 – BSKY – Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 41,86% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695 11 695
Interest 0 51 106 170 227 237 565 731 853 975 1 097
Ebit 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712
Rating AAA AAA AA A- A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 14,00 6,74 4,19 3,14 3,00 1,26 0,97 0,83 0,73 0,65
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72%
β0 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88
βl 0,88 0,95 1,04 1,15 1,30 1,33 1,50 1,81 2,33 3,36 6,45
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,35% 4,52% 4,85% 4,85% 4,85% 9,67% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
kd 3,04% 3,04% 3,16% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 6,77% 7,37% 7,81% 8,14% 8,39%
re 7,86% 8,18% 8,59% 9,11% 9,80% 9,96% 10,78% 12,24% 14,67% 19,54% 34,15%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 7,86% 7,67% 7,50% 7,39% 7,24% 7,21% 8,77% 9,32% 9,87% 10,42%10,97%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 45,19% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879 11 879
Interest 0 60 123 190 255 288 418 609 793 907 1 020
Ebit 865 865 865 865 865 865 865 865 865 865 865
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- BB B- CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 14,36 7,01 4,54 3,39 3,00 2,07 1,42 1,09 0,95 0,85
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54%
β0 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80
βl 0,80 0,86 0,94 1,04 1,17 1,26 1,36 1,64 2,11 3,04 5,84
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,19% 5,34% 5,37% 5,37% 7,04% 8,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,55% 3,55% 3,63% 3,74% 3,76% 3,76% 4,93% 5,98% 6,68% 6,81% 7,11%
re 7,74% 8,09% 8,52% 9,07% 9,81% 10,30% 10,85% 12,40% 14,98% 20,16% 35,67%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 7,74% 7,63% 7,54% 7,47% 7,39% 7,35% 7,89% 8,55% 9,17% 9,48% 9,97%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 39,03% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332 11 332
Interest 0 63 130 218 284 301 567 949 1 107 1 266 1 424
Ebit 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852
Rating AAA AAA AA A- A- BBB B CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 13,45 6,55 3,90 3,00 2,83 1,50 0,90 0,77 0,67 0,60
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02%
β0 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
βl 0,75 0,80 0,88 0,97 1,08 1,09 1,27 1,53 1,96 2,83 5,44
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 5,74% 6,42% 6,42% 6,63% 10,01% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,91% 3,91% 4,02% 4,49% 4,49% 4,64% 7,01% 10,20% 10,74% 11,14% 1,45%
re 7,69% 7,98% 8,34% 8,81% 9,36% 9,43% 10,30% 11,61% 13,79% 18,15% 31,24%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 7,69% 7,57% 7,48% 7,51% 7,46% 7,51% 8,66% 10,77% 11,65% 12,54% 13,43%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 33,64% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408 12 408
Interest 0 63 140 212 238 386 543 711 830 948 1 067
Ebit 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713
Rating AAA AAA A A- A- B+ B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 11,28 5,09 3,36 3,00 1,85 1,31 1,00 0,86 0,75 0,67
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46%
β0 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66
βl 0,66 0,71 0,77 0,85 0,89 0,96 1,11 1,34 1,73 2,49 4,79
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,64% 5,69% 5,69% 7,78% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,57% 3,57% 3,95% 3,99% 3,99% 5,45% 6,13% 6,69% 7,09% 7,40% 7,64%
re 7,23% 7,46% 7,74% 8,11% 8,27% 8,59% 9,28% 10,30% 12,00% 15,41% 25,64%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 7,23% 7,07% 6,98% 6,87% 6,83% 7,34% 7,70% 8,13% 8,56% 9,00% 9,44%
2007
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Table C95 – BSKY – Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C96 – BSKY – Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C97 – BSKY – Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C98 - Cyfrowy - Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 45,80% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682 12 682
Interest 0 49 107 176 237 271 322 789 921 1 052 1 184
Ebit 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 16,58 7,60 4,63 3,44 3,00 2,53 1,03 0,88 0,77 0,69
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99%
β0 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,69
βl 0,69 0,75 0,82 0,91 1,02 1,11 1,19 1,44 1,85 2,68 5,17
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 5,07% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,79% 2,79% 3,04% 3,33% 3,36% 3,36% 3,65% 7,47% 7,80% 8,12% 8,37%
re 5,71% 5,93% 6,21% 6,56% 7,04% 7,39% 7,70% 8,69% 10,35% 13,66% 23,59%
Tc 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00%
WACC 5,71% 5,62% 5,57% 5,59% 5,57% 5,55% 5,67% 7,96% 8,57% 9,23% 9,90%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 16,95% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540 13 540
Interest 0 58 99 139 216 310 1 206 1 447 1 688 1 929 2 170
Ebit 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842
Rating AAA AAA AAA A+ A- BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 14,41 8,50 6,08 3,90 2,72 0,70 0,58 0,50 0,44 0,39
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04%
β0 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71
βl 0,71 0,77 0,81 0,84 0,93 1,05 1,22 1,48 1,90 2,75 5,31
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,12% 5,32% 5,72% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,11% 3,11% 3,11% 3,68% 3,83% 4,12% 14,32% 14,90% 15,32% 15,63% 15,87%
re 6,25% 6,48% 6,67% 6,77% 7,14% 7,63% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 24,82%
Tc 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00%
WACC 6,25% 6,14% 6,07% 6,15% 6,14% 6,22% 16,07% 16,07% 16,07% 16,07% 16,77%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 52,86% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240 13 240
Interest 0 47 94 171 233 291 308 459 1 027 1 174 1 320
Ebit 924 924 924 924 924 924 924 924 924 924 924
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A- A- A- BB CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 19,66 9,83 5,41 3,97 3,17 3,00 2,01 0,90 0,79 0,70
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50%
β0 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70
βl 0,70 0,75 0,82 0,91 1,03 1,20 1,26 1,45 1,87 2,71 5,22
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 4,40% 5,78% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,56% 2,56% 2,56% 3,10% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 4,16% 8,29% 8,64% 8,91%
re 6,11% 6,36% 6,67% 7,08% 7,61% 8,37% 8,64% 9,50% 11,38% 15,16% 2 ,47%
Tc 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00%
WACC 6,11% 5,98% 5,85% 5,88% 5,84% 5,77% 5,75% 6,30% 9,22% 9,94% 10,66%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 21,17% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902
Interest 0 3 7 7 12 17 23 51 59 75 84
Ebit 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Rating AAA AAA AAA AAA A+ A- BBB B- B- CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 26,47 13,23 12,50 7,64 5,48 4,04 1,81 1,55 1,23 1,10
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36% 2,36%
β0 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47 0,47
βl 0,47 0,52 0,57 0,58 0,64 0,73 0,86 1,05 1,37 2,01 3,93
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 3,87% 4,47% 4,67% 5,07% 9,42% 9,42% 10,37%10,37%
kd 3,14% 3,14% 3,14% 3,14% 3,62% 3,78% 4,11% 7,63% 7,63% 8,40% 8,40%
re 4,07% 4,17% 4,29% 4,31% 4,46% 4,67% 4,97% 9,42% 9,42% 10,37%12,21%
Tc 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00%
WACC 4,07% 4,07% 4,06% 4,06% 4,21% 4,32% 4,54% 8,35% 8,17% 8,79% 8,78%
2008
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Table C99 – Cyfrowy – Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C100 – Cyfrowy – Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C101 – Liberty Global – Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C102 – Liberty Global – Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 13,66% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 901 901 901 901 901 901 901 901 901 901 901
Interest 0 4 5 9 14 64 80 96 112 128 144
Ebit 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Rating AAA AAA AAA A A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 17,07 12,50 7,06 4,62 1,03 0,83 0,69 0,59 0,52 0,46
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17%
β0 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44
βl 0,44 0,48 0,49 0,53 0,59 0,67 0,79 0,97 1,26 1,85 3,63
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,32% 5,22% 5,32% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,50% 3,50% 3,50% 4,23% 4,31% 14,42% 15,01% 15,47% 15,81% 16,06% 16,25%
re 4,77% 4,90% 4,95% 5,05% 5,25% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
Tc 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00%
WACC 4,77% 4,76% 4,75% 4,89% 4,97% 16,45% 16,41% 16,41% 16,41% 16,41% 16,41%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 17,96% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124 1 124
Interest 0 4 7 9 15 20 58 75 87 100 112
Ebit 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Rating AAA AAA AAA AA A A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 22,45 12,50 9,96 6,18 4,53 1,56 1,20 1,03 0,90 0,80
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17% 3,17%
β0 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45
βl 0,45 0,49 0,53 0,54 0,60 0,69 0,81 0,99 1,29 1,89 3,70
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,30% 4,40% 10,23% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,88% 2,88% 2,88% 3,24% 3,48% 3,56% 8,29% 8,97% 8,97% 9,19% 9,40%
re 4,38% 4,50% 4,63% 4,66% 4,87% 5,14% 10,23% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 14,68%
Tc 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00%
WACC 4,38% 4,34% 4,31% 4,38% 4,45% 4,51% 9,26% 9,82% 9,61% 9,57% 9,93%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 8,54% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173 15 173
Interest 0 70 128 290 434 579 724 869 1 013 1 158 1 303
Ebit 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209
Rating AAA A- B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 3,00 1,63 0,72 0,48 0,36 0,29 0,24 0,21 0,18 0,16
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90% 6,90%
β0 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27
βl 0,27 0,28 0,29 0,31 0,34 0,38 0,43 0,52 0,65 0,92 1,74
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,37% 8,44% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,08% 3,26% 5,13% 6,84% 7,74% 8,19% 8,46% 8,64% 8,77% 8,87% 8,94%
re 5,17% 5,28% 5,30% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,69% 15,34%
Tc 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28% 39,28%
WACC 5,17% 5,10% 5,28% 9,00% 9,00% 9,00% 9,00% 9,00% 9,00% 9,03% 9,58%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10,01% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 15 767 15 767 15 767 15 767 15 767 15 767 15 767 15 767 15 767 15 767
Interest 0 101 440 660 880 1 101 1 321 1 541 1 761 1 981
Ebit 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304
Rating AAA A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 3,00 0,69 0,46 0,35 0,28 0,23 0,20 0,17 0,15
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 6,44% 6,44% 6,44% 6,44% 6,44% 6,44% 6,44% 6,44% 6,44% 6,44%
β0 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15
βl 0,15 0,17 0,18 0,20 0,22 0,25 0,30 0,37 0,53 1,00
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 6,42% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,39% 3,90% 10,17% 11,44% 12,07% 12,45% 12,70% 12,88% 13,01% 13,12%
re 4,95% 5,01% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
Tc 39,30% 39,30% 39,30% 39,30% 39,30% 39,30% 39,30% 39,30% 39,30% 39,30%
WACC 4,95% 4,90% 13,20% 13,20% 13,20% 13,20% 13,20% 13,20% 13,20% 13,20%
2006
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Table C103 – Liberty Global – Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C104 – Liberty Global – Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C105 – Liberty Global – Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C106 – Liberty Global – Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 22,15% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402 19 402
Interest 0 107 233 258 509 741 927 1 112 1 297 1 483 1 668
Ebit 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644 644
Rating AAA A+ BBB BBB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 6,04 2,77 2,50 1,26 0,87 0,69 0,58 0,50 0,43 0,39
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74%
β0 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29
βl 0,29 0,31 0,33 0,34 0,36 0,40 0,46 0,55 0,69 0,98 1,86
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,49% 5,99% 5,99% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,09% 3,34% 3,64% 3,64% 5,32% 6,30% 6,95% 7,38% 7,69% 7,92% 8,11%
re 5,95% 6,07% 6,20% 6,24% 6,38% 6,62% 6,95% 7,45% 8,29% 9,96% 14,96%
Tc 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26% 39,26%
WACC 5,95% 5,79% 5,69% 5,66% 6,06% 6,49% 6,95% 7,41% 7,87% 8,33% 8,79%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 43,06% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029 17.029
Interest 0 66 144 236 318 343 802 1.060 1.236 1.413 1.589
Ebit 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.028
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ? 15,59 7,15 4,35 3,23 3,00 1,28 0,97 0,83 0,73 0,65
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
β0 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25
βl 0,25 0,27 0,29 0,32 0,35 0,37 0,40 0,48 0,61 0,86 1,63
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 9,42% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,35% 2,35% 2,56% 2,81% 2,84% 2,84% 5,72% 6,42% 6,99% 7,41% 7,74%
re 4,04% 4,11% 4,20% 4,32% 4,48% 4,53% 9,42% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%
Tc 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25% 39,25%
WACC 4,04% 3,93% 3,87% 3,87% 3,82% 3,80% 7,57% 8,00% 8,00% 8,00% 8,00%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 21,00% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048 21 048
Interest 0 103 224 235 1 124 1 499 1 874 2 249 2 624 2 998 3 373
Ebit 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Rating AAA AA A- A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 6,83 3,16 3,01 0,63 0,47 0,38 0,31 0,27 0,24 0,21
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48% 4,48%
β0 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,27
βl 0,27 0,29 0,31 0,32 0,34 0,38 0,44 0,52 0,66 0,94 1,77
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,92% 5,32% 5,32% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 2,63% 2,99% 3,24% 3,24% 13,43% 14,53% 15,18% 15,62% 15,93% 16,17% 16,35%
re 4,61% 4,69% 4,79% 4,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
Tc 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10% 39,10%
WACC 4,61% 4,52% 4,48% 4,48% 16,49% 16,49% 16,49% 16,49% 16,49% 16,49% 16,49%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 34,33% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228 23 228
Interest 0 82 200 307 351 1 029 1 287 1 544 1 802 2 059 2 316
Ebit 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053 1 053
Rating AAA AAA A A- A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,77 5,27 3,43 3,00 1,02 0,82 0,68 0,58 0,51 0,45
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07% 5,07%
β0 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48
βl 0,48 0,52 0,56 0,61 0,64 0,68 0,78 0,92 1,17 1,66 3,13
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,16% 2,16% 2,61% 2,67% 2,67% 6,74% 7,53% 8,12% 8,54% 8,86% 9,11%
re 5,41% 5,58% 5,79% 6,05% 6,19% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 8,89% 11,37% 18,82%
Tc 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21% 39,21%
WACC 5,41% 5,24% 5,15% 5,04% 4,98% 9,34% 9,30% 9,30% 8,65% 9,36% 10,08%
2010
Capital structure decisions in the context of corporate spin-offs: The case of PT Multimedia 
 
Pedro Martins - 150203012 Page 75 
 
Table C107 – Sonaecom – Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C108 – Sonaecom – Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C109 – Sonaecom – Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C110 – Sonaecom – Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 8,83% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176 1 176
Interest 0 5 6 24 36 48 60 72 84 95 107
Ebit 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Rating AAA A- BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 4,50 3,65 0,90 0,60 0,45 0,36 0,30 0,26 0,22 0,20
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36% 1,36%
β0 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,65
βl 0,65 0,70 0,70 0,77 0,85 0,97 1,12 1,36 1,75 2,54 4,90
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,08% 4,58% 4,99% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15%10,15% 10,15%
kd 2,96% 3,32% 3,62% 7,65% 8,48% 8,90% 9,15% 9,32% 9,44% 9,53% 9,60%
re 4,57% 4,63% 4,64% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15% 10,15%10,15% 10,35%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 4,57% 4,52% 4,54% 9,65% 9,65% 9,65% 9,65% 9,65% 9,65% 9,65% 9,67%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 4,50% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546 1 546
Interest 0 3 13 26 40 53 66 79 92 106 119
Ebit 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Rating AAA A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 4,50 1,04 0,52 0,35 0,26 0,21 0,17 0,15 0,13 0,12
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37% 2,37%
β0 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,61
βl 0,61 0,64 0,66 0,73 0,80 0,91 1,06 1,28 1,65 2,40 4,62
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,07% 4,37% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54%
kd 2,95% 3,17% 6,19% 7,32% 7,73% 7,93% 8,06% 8,14% 8,20% 8,24% 8,27%
re 4,77% 4,81% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,54% 8,99% 14,27%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 4,77% 4,74% 8,31% 8,30% 8,30% 8,30% 8,30% 8,30% 8,30% 8,39% 8,87%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 1,15% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 303 2 03
Interest 0 1 32 64 96 129 161 193 225 257 289
Ebit 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Rating AAA AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,50 0,58 0,29 0,19 0,14 0,12 0,10 0,08 0,07 0,06
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93% 2,93%
β0 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66 0,66
βl 0,66 0,67 0,72 0,78 0,87 0,98 1,14 1,38 1,78 2,58 4,98
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 4,05% 4,05% 11,75% 12,86% 13,22% 13,41% 13,52% 13,59% 13,64% 13,68% 13,71%
re 5,89% 5,90% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 18,54%
Tc 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50% 27,50%
WACC 5,89% 5,88% 13,74% 13,74% 13,74% 13,74% 13,74% 13,74% 13,74% 13,74% 14,20%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 11,38% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603 1 603
Interest 0 8 9 18 29 53 70 92 107 122 138
Ebit 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Rating AAA AAA AAA A BBB B B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 4,46 3,92 2,01 1,26 0,69 0,52 0,40 0,34 0,30 0,26
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32% 3,32%
β0 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59
βl 0,59 0,64 0,65 0,70 0,78 0,89 1,03 1,25 1,61 2,34 4,53
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,09% 5,64% 5,99% 8,25% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,74% 3,74% 3,74% 4,15% 4,41% 6,75% 7,55% 8,55% 8,69% 8,80% 8,88%
re 6,28% 6,44% 6,47% 6,64% 6,90% 7,25% 7,73% 9,55% 9,66% 12,08%19,33%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 6,28% 6,17% 6,16% 6,14% 6,15% 7,05% 7,64% 8,95% 8,98% 9,46% 9,93%
2007
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Table C111 – Sonaecom – Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C112 – Sonaecom – Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C113 – Sonaecom – Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C114 – Telenet – Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 5,88% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Interest 0 2 4 15 24 32 40 48 56 64 72
Ebit 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Rating AAA AAA A B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 12,50 6,15 1,51 0,91 0,69 0,55 0,46 0,39 0,34 0,30
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13% 2,13%
β0 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
βl 0,50 0,52 0,54 0,59 0,65 0,74 0,86 1,05 1,35 1,96 3,79
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 4,62% 9,42% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,85% 2,85% 3,40% 6,92% 7,86% 8,49% 8,86% 9,12% 9,29% 9,43% 9,53%
re 4,01% 4,06% 4,10% 9,42% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 11,02%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 4,01% 3,99% 4,03% 8,92% 9,62% 9,62% 9,62% 9,62% 9,62% 9,62% 9,68%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 1 076 1 076 1 076 1 076 1 076 1 076 1 076 1 076 1 076 1 076
Interest 0 19 38 57 77 96 115 134 153 172
Ebit 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Rating AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 1,00 0,50 0,33 0,25 0,20 0,17 0,14 0,12 0,11
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82% 2,82%
β0 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63
βl 0,63 0,68 0,74 0,83 0,94 1,09 1,32 1,71 2,48 4,78
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,17% 13,10% 15,45% 16,24% 16,63% 16,87% 17,02% 17,13% 17,22% 17,28%
re 5,16% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 5,16% 17,34% 17,34% 17,34% 17,34% 17,34% 17,34% 17,34% 17,34% 17,34%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839
Interest 0 9 19 28 37 46 56 65 74 84
Ebit 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Rating AAA B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 1,57 0,73 0,48 0,36 0,29 0,24 0,21 0,18 0,16
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07% 3,07%
β0 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57
βl 0,57 0,61 0,67 0,75 0,85 0,98 1,19 1,54 2,24 4,32
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 10,23% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,61% 7,52% 8,95% 9,66% 10,01% 10,23% 10,37% 10,47% 10,55% 10,61%
re 4,71% 10,23% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 16,24%
Tc 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50%
WACC 4,71% 9,96% 10,65% 10,65% 10,65% 10,65% 10,65% 10,65% 10,65% 11,17%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 26,96% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028 3 028
Interest 0 15 33 44 64 103 144 173 202 231 260
Ebit 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Rating AAA AAA A- A- BB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 8,57 4,04 3,00 2,06 1,27 0,91 0,76 0,65 0,57 0,51
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91% 6,91%
β0 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63
βl 0,63 0,68 0,73 0,78 0,81 0,91 1,05 1,25 1,60 2,29 4,37
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 5,07% 5,37% 5,37% 7,04% 8,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 3,35% 3,35% 3,55% 3,55% 4,65% 5,64% 6,59% 7,08% 7,43% 7,70% 7,90%
re 7,66% 7,98% 8,38% 8,73% 8,90% 9,58% 10,54% 11,98% 14,37% 19,17% 33,54%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 7,66% 7,52% 7,42% 7,33% 7,62% 8,00% 8,56% 9,04% 9,51% 9,99% 10,46%
2005
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Table C115 – Telenet – Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
Table C116 – Telenet – Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C117 – Telenet – Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C118 – Telenet – Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 23,95% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621 3 621
Interest 0 21 46 57 113 202 253 303 354 404 455
Ebit 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Rating AAA AA A- BBB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 6,92 3,09 2,50 1,27 0,71 0,57 0,47 0,41 0,36 0,32
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96% 6,96%
β0 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64
βl 0,64 0,69 0,75 0,77 0,82 0,92 1,06 1,28 1,63 2,33 4,45
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,74% 6,42% 6,63% 10,41% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,69% 3,79% 4,24% 4,38% 6,87% 10,59% 11,26% 11,71% 12,03% 12,27% 12,46%
re 8,41% 8,74% 9,15% 9,34% 9,67% 13,96% 11,35% 12,83% 15,28% 20,19% 34,92%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 8,41% 8,24% 8,16% 8,15% 8,83% 12,61% 11,31% 12,16% 13,01% 13,86% 14,71%
2006
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 28,64% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196 4 196
Interest 0 21 47 68 75 147 200 241 281 321 361
Ebit 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
Rating AAA AAA A a- BBB B- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 9,61 4,33 3,00 2,72 1,40 1,02 0,85 0,73 0,64 0,57
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74% 5,74%
β0 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48
βl 0,48 0,51 0,56 0,61 0,61 0,69 0,79 0,95 1,22 1,74 3,32
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,09% 5,64% 5,69% 5,99% 8,75% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,36% 3,36% 3,73% 3,76% 3,96% 5,78% 6,31% 6,78% 7,18% 7,47% 7,71%
re 7,06% 7,26% 7,51% 7,79% 7,84% 8,27% 8,87% 9,78% 11,29% 14,32% 23,40%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 7,06% 6,87% 6,75% 6,63% 6,67% 7,27% 7,59% 7,98% 8,41% 8,84% 9,27%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 44,46% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832 3.832
Interest 0 15 32 53 72 80 180 238 278 318 358
Ebit 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- B- CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ? 16,10 7,38 4,49 3,33 3,00 1,32 1,00 0,86 0,75 0,67
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34% 3,34%
β0 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40
βl 0,40 0,43 0,46 0,51 0,57 0,61 0,66 0,79 1,01 1,45 2,76
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 3,87% 4,22% 4,62% 4,67% 4,67% 9,42% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,56% 2,56% 2,79% 3,05% 3,08% 3,08% 6,22% 6,85% 7,35% 7,72% 8,02%
re 4,28% 4,38% 4,50% 4,66% 4,87% 4,98% 9,42% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 12,18%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 4,28% 4,20% 4,16% 4,18% 4,15% 4,14% 7,82% 8,26% 8,25% 8,25% 8,43%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 40,96% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568 4 568
Interest 0 20 45 73 97 99 192 488 569 651 732
Ebit 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299
Rating AAA AAA AA A- A- A- B+ CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 15,14 6,65 4,10 3,07 3,00 1,55 0,61 0,52 0,46 0,41
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
β0 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46
βl 0,46 0,49 0,53 0,59 0,66 0,67 0,76 0,91 1,16 1,66 3,17
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 4,92% 5,32% 5,32% 5,32% 8,41% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
kd 2,85% 2,85% 3,25% 3,51% 3,51% 3,51% 5,55% 14,10% 14,63% 15,03% 15,34%
re 5,07% 5,19% 5,34% 5,54% 5,81% 5,84% 6,18% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 5,07% 4,96% 4,92% 4,93% 4,89% 4,88% 5,86% 15,59% 15,59% 15,59% 15,59%
2009
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Table C119 – Telenet – Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
Table C120 – Virgin Media – Optimal Debt Level 2004 
 
Table C121 – Virgin Media – Optimal Debt Level 2005 
 
Table C122 – Virgin Media – Optimal Debt Level 2006 
 
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 42,14% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192 6.192
Interest 0 22 50 80 109 115 343 412 480 549 617
Ebit 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345
Rating AAA AAA AA A A- A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ? 15,67 6,95 4,31 3,16 3,00 1,00 0,84 0,72 0,63 0,56
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93% 3,93%
β0 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48
βl 0,48 0,52 0,56 0,62 0,70 0,72 0,80 0,96 1,23 1,77 3,37
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 3,55% 4,00% 4,30% 4,40% 4,40% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,34% 2,34% 2,64% 2,84% 2,90% 2,90% 7,31% 7,93% 8,38% 8,72% 8,98%
re 4,87% 5,01% 5,18% 5,41% 5,71% 5,78% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 16,19%
Tc 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99%
WACC 4,87% 4,74% 4,67% 4,64% 4,59% 4,57% 9,20% 9,19% 9,19% 9,19% 9,70%
2010
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 5,10% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745 5 745
Interest 0 14 60 120 180 239 299 359 419 479 539
Ebit 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Rating AAA A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 3,00 0,71 0,36 0,24 0,18 0,14 0,12 0,10 0,09 0,08
rf 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68% 3,68%
rm-rf 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72% 4,72%
β0 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
βl 0,50 0,52 0,54 0,59 0,66 0,74 0,86 1,03 1,33 1,92 3,68
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,35% 4,85% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42%
kd 3,04% 3,39% 8,19% 9,30% 9,68% 9,86% 9,97% 10,05% 10,10% 10,14% 0,17%
re 6,06% 6,15% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 10,42% 12,73% 21,07%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 6,06% 6,01% 10,20% 10,20% 10,20% 10,20% 10,20% 10,20% 10,20% 10,66% 11,26%
2004
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 7.595 7.595 7.595 7.595 7.595 7.595 7.595 7.595 7.595 7.595
Interest 0 72 145 217 290 362 435 507 580 652
Ebit -29 -29 -29 -29 -29 -29 -29 -29 -29 -29
Rating AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ? -0,40 -0,20 -0,13 -0,10 -0,08 -0,07 -0,06 -0,05 -0,04
rf 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31% 3,31%
rm-rf 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54% 5,54%
β0 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37
βl 0,37 0,40 0,44 0,48 0,54 0,63 0,76 0,98 1,41 2,70
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,07% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
kd 5,07% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54%
re 5,36% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 11,11% 18,29%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 5,36% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,54% 9,85% 10,42%
2005
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 0,20% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176 15 176
Interest 0 2 212 424 636 847 1 059 1 271 1 483 1 695 1 907
Ebit 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Rating AAA AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 8,50 0,07 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
rf 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95% 3,95%
rm-rf 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02% 5,02%
β0 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24
βl 0,24 0,24 0,26 0,29 0,32 0,36 0,42 0,50 0,64 0,93 1,78
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,59% 5,59% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
kd 3,91% 3,91% 13,68% 13,82% 13,87% 13,89% 13,90% 13,91% 13,92% 13,92% 13,93%
re 5,17% 5,18% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96% 13,96%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 5,17% 5,17% 13,93% 13,93% 13,93% 13,93% 13,93% 13,93% 13,93% 13,93% 13,93%
2006
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Table C123 – Virgin Media – Optimal Debt Level 2007 
 
Table C124 – Virgin Media – Optimal Debt Level 2008 
 
Table C125 – Virgin Media – Optimal Debt Level 2009 
 
Table C126 – Virgin Media – Optimal Debt Level 2010 
 
values in €M+C91:N108
D/(D+E) 0% 1,35% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950 11 950
Interest 0 10 114 228 342 457 571 685 799 913 1 027
Ebit 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Rating AAA BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 2,50 0,21 0,11 0,07 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,02
rf 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31% 4,31%
rm-rf 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46% 4,46%
β0 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34 1,34
βl 1,34 1,36 1,45 1,58 1,75 1,97 2,28 2,75 3,54 5,10 9,81
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 5,09% 5,99% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55% 9,55%
kd 3,57% 4,20% 8,94% 9,25% 9,35% 9,40% 9,43% 9,45% 9,47% 9,48% 9,49%
re 10,29% 10,35% 10,76% 11,34% 12,09% 13,09% 14,48% 16,58% 20,07% 27,05% 48,01%
Tc 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
WACC 10,29% 10,27% 10,58% 10,92% 11,27% 11,61% 11,96% 12,30% 12,65% 12,99% 13,34%
2007
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 13,32% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619 7.619
Interest 0 36 47 158 237 316 395 474 553 632 711
Ebit 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
Rating AAA A- A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ? 4,00 3,00 0,90 0,60 0,45 0,36 0,30 0,26 0,22 0,20
rf 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95% 2,95%
rm-rf 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99% 3,99%
β0 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45
βl 0,45 0,48 0,50 0,53 0,59 0,66 0,77 0,93 1,20 1,74 3,35
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,87% 4,67% 4,67% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%10,37% 10,37%
kd 2,79% 3,36% 3,36% 7,76% 8,63% 9,06% 9,33% 9,50% 9,62% 9,72% 9,79%
re 4,74% 4,88% 4,93% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37% 10,37%10,37% 16,31%
Tc 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00%
WACC 4,74% 4,73% 4,73% 9,85% 9,85% 9,85% 9,85% 9,85% 9,85% 9,85% 10,44%
2008
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 3,80% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617 10 617
Interest 0 17 64 378 567 756 945 1 134 1 323 1 512 1 702
Ebit 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Rating AAA AAA BB+ CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 8,50 2,31 0,39 0,26 0,20 0,16 0,13 0,11 0,10 0,09
rf 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39% 3,39%
rm-rf 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04% 4,04%
β0 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78
βl 0,78 0,80 0,84 0,92 1,02 1,16 1,34 1,63 2,09 3,03 5,85
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 4,32% 4,32% 6,04% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%17,81% 17,81%
kd 3,11% 3,11% 4,35% 15,85% 16,50% 16,83% 17,03% 17,16% 17,25%17,32% 17,37%
re 6,54% 6,63% 6,80% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81% 17,81%17,81% 26,99%
Tc 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00%
WACC 6,54% 6,50% 6,55% 17,42% 17,42% 17,42% 17,42% 17,42% 17,42%17,42% 18,33%
2009
values in €M
D/(D+E) 0% 10% 20% 20,93% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
D+E 13 585 13 585 13 585 13 585 13 585 13 585 13 585 13 585 13 85 13 585 13 585
Interest 0 54 120 125 452 602 753 903 1 054 1 204 1 355
Ebit 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375
Rating AAA AA A- A- CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
ICR ∞ 6,91 3,14 3,00 0,83 0,62 0,50 0,42 0,36 0,31 0,28
rf 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96% 2,96%
rm-rf 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50% 4,50%
β0 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97
βl 0,97 1,05 1,15 1,16 1,27 1,44 1,67 2,02 2,60 3,77 7,26
Pre-Tax Cost of Debt 3,55% 4,00% 4,40% 4,40% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08% 11,08%
kd 2,56% 2,88% 3,17% 3,17% 8,50% 9,15% 9,53% 9,79% 9,97% 10,11%0,22%
re 7,33% 7,68% 8,12% 8,16% 8,68% 9,43% 10,48% 12,05% 14,67% 19,91% 35,64%
Tc 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00%
WACC 7,33% 7,20% 7,13% 7,12% 8,63% 9,31% 10,00% 10,69% 11,38% 12,07% 12,76%
2010
